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This dissertation examines the important role mortality risk plays in educational 
attainment and bequest motives. Chapter 1 investigates the importance of mortality risk 
in explaining racial difference in education based on a dynamic optimal stopping-point 
life cycle model. Calibration results show that that more than two-thirds of the empirical 
difference in education between black and white males can be accounted for by the 
difference in their mortality differences. Chapter 2 studies interdependence between 
health and educational attainment. The structural estimation framework fully imposes the 
restrictions of the existing theoretical hypotheses on the correlation between health and 
education. The model’s estimates imply that an individual’s initial health status has a 
substantial influence on an individual’s educational attainment and the expected 
probability of survival. Policy experiments based on the model’s estimates indicate that a 
health expenditure subsidy conditional on high school attendance would have a larger 
impact on the educational attainment than a direct college tuition subsidy. Chapter 3 
investigates whether subjective expectations about future mortality affect consumption 
 vi
and bequests motives. A dynamic life-cycle model is applied to subjective survival rates 
and wealth from the panel dataset Asset and Health Dynamics among Oldest Old. The 
results show that bequest motives are small on average, which indicates that most 
bequests are involuntary or accidental. Moreover, parameter estimates using subjective 
mortality risk perform better in predicting out-of-sample wealth levels than estimates 
using life table mortality risk, suggesting that decisions about consumption and saving 
are influenced more strongly by individual-level beliefs about mortality risk than by 
group level mortality risk. 
 vii
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Black-white wage and income disparity is a persistent social problem in the 
United States. A significant body of work has attributed this disparity to forms of 
discrimination in market places.1 Anti-discrimination legislation and programs enjoyed 
early success: blacks reduced the gap with whites during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, the black-white gap stagnated from the 1980s through the early 1990s and then 
widened in most of the 1990s. In the 1990s, a large body of literature explored whether 
the black-white gap was a result of factors other than discrimination. Among them, a 
series of papers found that wage differences between blacks and whites can be explained 
by differences in their pre-market conditions, especially by differences in their 
educational attainment. For example, O’Neill (1990) finds that black-white wage 
differences almost disappear when blacks have the same level of education and Armed 
Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) scores as whites. Similar results are found in Maxwell 
(1994) and Neal and Johnson (1996); Winship and Korenman (1997) and Neal and 
Johnson (1996) provide convincing evidence that AFQT scores are heavily influenced by 
the number of years of schooling.  
Although there are many interpretations of the factors behind fewer years of 
schooling for blacks than for whites, in this study we provide a different explanation 
through mortality risk. Intuitively, education as an investment possesses risk. Although 
the market education return may be the same for all people, higher mortality risks will 
                                                 
1 See a survey by Altonji and Blank (1999). 
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lower the individual return of education and, therefore, might result in fewer years of 
schooling. Blacks have higher mortality risks than whites, which affords higher risk to 
reap the wage benefits of schooling. Fewer years of schooling could, then, become 
blacks’ optimal choice. 
A large body of studies finds that health and schooling are highly correlated. For 
example, the life expectancy at birth in England rose from 37.3 to 48.2 years in the 
nineteenth century and further increased to 60.8 years by 1930. During the same period, 
the average years of schooling rose from 2.3 years to 9.1 years (see Livi-Bacci [1997] and 
Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee [1982]). Neoclassical growth literatures interpret 
the progress on health through the improvement of economic conditions such as gains in 
per capita income and hence indirectly attribute the gain in health to the improvement of 
human capital and the relative increase of the amount of schooling. The basic idea of 
those literatures is that education raises income; a higher income improves nutrition and 
increase health expenditure, which in turn reduces mortality. Nevertheless, other studies 
show that the strong relation between health and schooling could reflect the reverse 
causality, i.e., schooling could be responding to the anticipated amelioration in health. 
Particularly, some studies argue that health might also be a determinant force behind 
economic development with its large exogenous component unrelated to scientific 
knowledge and technological development. For instance, life expectancy in China and Sri 
Lanka exceeds 70 years, despite these nations having gross national products in 1994 of 
less than $1,000 per capita (Sen [1999]). Preston (1980, 1996) relates life expectancy 
changes to income, calorie consumption, and disease, and he concludes that 
approximately 50% of the changes in life expectancy were due to “structural factors” 
unrelated to economic development. Fries (1980) states that there is a genetically 
determined upper limit to life of 85 ± 7 years. Soares (2002) shows that recent reductions 
in mortality rates across countries were largely independent of improvements in 
economic conditions.  
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In this study, we develop a dynamic optimal stopping-point life cycle model in 
which group-level mortality risk plays an important role in determining individual-level 
mortality risk, health expenditure, and the amount of schooling. We posit that the 
mortality risks of the reference group have a negative externality effect on an individual’s 
mortality. In our model, the mortality risks depend not only on health expenditure, but 
also on the mortality risks of the reference group by which the individual is categorized. 
Our approach to studying the effect of mortality changes on education is related to the 
work of Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000) and Soares 
(2002), each of which takes mortality as an exogenous constant to individuals. In 
contrast, we advance this model to integrate mortality risks into an individual’s choices. 
Although the mortality risks of the reference group for individuals are still taken as 
exogenous in our framework, the individual-level mortality risks and education are 
endogenously determined.  
The idea of linking the reference group to its effects on mortality risks is nothing 
new. While genetic traits and lifestyle are usually thought of as the predominant factors 
explaining health status and mortality, there is a growing consensus that the groups 
themselves (such as the residential neighborhoods or local community where people live) 
play an important part in determining people’s health. In a related way, a growing 
literature on social interactions claims that individual outcome is strongly influenced by 
reference group due to sociological and/or psychological factors (see Manski [1993] and 
Durlauf [2002]). One bridge linking the reference group to health is the effect of role 
model or peer group influence in which an individual may desire to conform to the 
behaviors of older or contemporaneous members of his group and intend to mimic their 
behaviors. Some of these behaviors are health related, such as smoking, dietary habits, 
and physical activity, and therefore have detrimental effects on health. Another link 
between reference group and health is the psychosocial stress caused by diseases or 
crimes, which may have adverse biological consequences on the individual’s health. 
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Empirical studies finding the relationship between the characteristics of the reference 
group and the individual’s health outcomes are plentiful. Roux et al. (2001) find that 
living in a disadvantaged neighborhood will increase the incidence of coronary heart 
disease even after controlling for personal income, education, and occupation. After 
investigating the influence of individual neighborhood socioeconomic status on mortality, 
Winkleby and Cubbin (2003) show that a person who lives in a poor neighborhood has a 
20% higher death rate than a person who lives in a rich neighborhood after controlling for 
individual characteristics.  
We apply the model to study the impact of differential mortality risks on the 
educational attainment of black and white men.2 In particular, we consider an agent at 
the age of 16, having finished compulsory education, deciding (with his parents) how 
many additional years of schooling to obtain. The agent faces the probability of death in 
every period and maximizes the discounted value of the expected utility from 
consumption and leisure. We assume that a black man has the same utility, discount rate, 
return to education, and living and working conditions as a white man. The only 
difference between a black man and a white man is the mortality risk of their reference 
groups. In this model, both the years of schooling and the life expectancy at the 
individual level are endogenously determined. The exogenous variable is the reference 
group’s mortality risk.  
It is important to point out that we do not claim here that factors such as labor 
market discrimination, differential opportunities in access to higher education, and 
parental and occupational preferences do not affect the life prospects of black and white 
men. What this study shows is that the mortality differences can explain the difference in 
                                                 
2 We focus our attention only on men. Studying the effect of mortality on education is considerably more 
difficult for women than for men since women are more likely to face additional choices in leaving the 
labor force temporarily to have and raise children. Therefore, any meaningful analysis of the effect of 




schooling years obtained when all other factors are the same for both black men and 
white men. 
The model is calibrated to quantify the strength of the effect of mortality risks on 
schooling. We let the black male population be the reference group for a black man while 
the white male population is the reference group for a white man. Under a set of 
reasonable parameter values, our baseline results show that the impact of mortality risk 
on schooling explains more than two-thirds of the empirical education differences 
between black and white males. This remains true with a series of sensitivity analyses. 
Each time we change one of the values of parameters while holding other parameters at 
their baseline values. We find that although the levels of educational attainment for both 
blacks and whites deviate from the observed years of schooling, the difference in years of 
schooling between black men and white men varies little. Since the only difference 
between blacks and whites is their reference groups’ mortality risks, we claim that the 
observed difference in mortality risks between black men and white men can explain 
most of their differences in education.   
Understanding why blacks have less education than whites has important policy 
implications. If education is the key reason for future wage differences, public policies 
designed to reduce the black-white wage gap should concentrate on helping blacks attain 
more education.  If the higher mortality risk of blacks is a major cause of less education, 
then public policies should put more emphasis on improving access to health care and 
intervening in the composition of residential neighborhoods, such as making 
predominantly black neighborhoods safer (since part of the risk may result from living in 
high-crime neighborhoods).  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section II introduces a mortality 
production function and develops a dynamic optimal stopping-point model. In Section III 
we calibrate the model and explore whether the difference of mortality risks between 
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black males and white males is capable of generating the observed educational difference. 
A brief conclusion is given in Section IV. 
 
1.2 THE MODEL 
In this section, we develop a dynamic optimal stopping-point model to analyze the 
effects of mortality risks on years of schooling. We start with the mortality risk 
production function since it explicitly illustrates the channel from mortality to schooling.  
We assume that an individual’s production function of mortality risk is:   
( ) ( ) ( )tdetmtm βµ −= ˆ ,        (1.1) 
where m is the hazard rate of the individual,  is the hazard rate of the reference group, 
and d is the health expenditure. The term “health expenditure” includes all expenditures 
that may affect an agent’s mortality, such as time and money spent on health clubs, 
appropriate nutrition, medical insurance, and other expenses related to health care. 
Spending on smoking can also be included as a negative expenditure. Health expenditure 
as an input into the production function of mortality has been broadly used in the 
literature of health economics since Grossman (1972a, 1972b). Individual-specific health 
characteristics, such as genetic traits and illness, are captured by a positive parameter µ.  
The exponential specification in (1.1) implies that health expenditure has a decreasing 
marginal effect on health, with β being the percentage gain in mortality reduction from 
one unit of health expenditure.  
m̂
The negative externality of the reference group’s mortality on individual health, 
as argued in Section 1.1, has been substantiated in growing studies. Although the 
mortality risk of the reference group is taken as exogenous to the individual in the model, 
the current model does not offer any guidance as to how the reference group is selected. 
For example, a black male may choose the general black male population as his reference 
group. Alternatively, he may view a smaller group of people whom he is familiar with, 
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such as his family and friends, as his reference group. It is also possible for a black male 
living in a suburban white neighborhood to view the white male population as his 
reference group. In other words, identifying the reference group may be subjective.  
It is worth noting that (1.1) assumes that an agent’s mortality is only affected by 
his reference group’s mortality and his health expenditure. The agent’s education affects 
his mortality only by health related expenditure. However, previous literature shows that 
a better-educated agent can be more effective in using the money he spends on reducing 
mortality (or productive efficiency). In addition, since a better educated agent may have 
more knowledge of the adverse effects of some activities (i.e., smoking, bad diet, etc.) 
and the positive effects of other activities (i.e., exercise, appropriate diet, etc.), he is more 
likely to allocate resources to improve his health (or allocative efficiency).3 Modeling 
these two efficiencies in the current framework is beyond the scope of this study. 
With the mortality risk production function in (1.1), the survival rate for the 
individual is given by:    
( ) ( )[ ]{ }dttdtmtp t  expˆ exp)(
0∫ −−= βµ .     (1.2) 
Equation (1.2) implies that the level of survival rate for an individual is a positive 
function of his current and past health expenditure.  
Now we turn to the dynamic optimal stopping-point model. We consider an 
individual who is 16 years old. After finishing his compulsory years of schooling, he 
(with his parents) chooses how many additional years of schooling he will undertake. Let 
the instantaneous utility at time t be ( ) ( )( )tltcu , , where ( )tc  is consumption and ( )tl  is 
leisure (the labor supply is ( )1 l t− ). The function ),( ⋅⋅u  is assumed to be strictly 
concave, increasing in each argument, twice continuously differentiable. The lifetime 
utility maximization problem is, in the formulation of Yaari (1965): 
                                                 
3 For a survey on productive efficiency, see Grossman (2000); the survey on allocative efficiency can be 
found in Kenkel (2000). 
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where choice variable S is the amount of additional schooling after 9 years of compulsory 
schooling, θ is the time discount rate, T is the time of retirement, and N is the maximum 
longevity. In this model, we let the retirement age and maximum longevity be exogenous. 
We assume that the individual retires at age 65, thus T = 49 (i.e., age 65 minus the initial 
age 16). And we let the maximum age to which the individual could survive be 110, thus 
N = 94 (i.e. age 110 minus the initial age 16). The only uncertainty that the agent faces at 
any future date comes from the possibility of death.  
The lifetime utility in (1.3) consists of three parts, representing three stages of the 
individual’s life cycle. The first part in (1.3) is the expected utility from schooling. At the 
schooling stage, we assume that schooling is structured such that leisure from schooling 
in each period is a constant, ( ) ltl =  for t<S. The individual chooses additional years of 
schooling, S, and a consumption profile at this stage. The life cycle model in (1.3) 
assumes irreversibility: if an individual has started to work, he cannot come back to 
school again at later time in his life cycle. The second part in (1.3) is the expected utility 
from working. At this stage, the individual chooses a profile of consumption and leisure. 
At time T, the agent retires from work. The third part in (1.3) describes the expected 
utility from retirement. At this stage, the agent only chooses a consumption profile. His 
leisure after retirement is 1. 
Corresponding to the life cycle utility function in (1.3), the agent’s wealth (or 
asset) accumulation equation is divided into three parts: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )























   (1.4) 
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where A(t) is wealth at time t, h(t) is the human capital at time t, and w is wage rate per 
unit of human capital. The market interest rate r is assumed to be constant. At the first 
stage, the individual accumulates human capital with the rate g(t) at each t. Function g(·) 
is increasing and concave in the amount of schooling. Following Bils and Klenow (2000), 
we assume that the cost of education (including tuition, room and board) increases with 
the level of education. The parameter ξ(>0) is the ratio of schooling cost to the 
opportunity cost of student time. At the second stage, the agent goes to work and earns 
the labor income, defined as per unit of labor wage (wh(t)) multiplied by his labor supply 
( ). For convenience, we assume that there is no accumulation or depreciation of 
human capital at this stage. At the third stage, the agent retires and consumes the wealth 
he accumulated when he worked. The initial and end wealth are assumed to be zero, and 
the initial human capital is given.  
( )1 l t−
The first-order conditions yield the differential equations for consumption:4   











,& )      (1.5a) 











          (1.5b) 











1,& ) .    (1.5c) 
Equations (1.5a)–(1.5c) are the ordinary Euler equations respectively 
corresponding to different stages. These three equations describe necessary conditions 
that have to be satisfied on any optimal path. At any ),[ TSt ∈ , the optimal consumption 
and leisure make the marginal rate of substitution equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation: 
                                                 




( ) ( )( )





, .        (1.6) 
At the times S and T, there are jumps in consumption and leisure. The 
consumption and leisure at these two points satisfy the conditions: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )++− = SlSculScu cc ,, ,  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1,, +−− = TcuTlTcu cc ,  (1.7) 
where  is defined as t < S and , while  is defined as t > S and . The 
variables 
−S St → +S St →
−T  and +T are analogues to and . Equation (1.7) says that the optimal 
consumption and leisure will make the marginal utility of consumption be the same at the 
time when the agent switches from one stage to another stage (i.e., from schooling to 
working and from working to retirement). 
−S +S
The optimal health expenditure satisfies 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,,, )( tptltcudvevmvpvlvcu c
N
t
tv∫ =−−θβ ( )    (1.8) 
where the left-hand side (divided by the right-hand side) is the change (in monetary unit) 
of the present value of utility from increases in current and future survival rates caused by 
health expenditure. Therefore, equation (1.8) implies that the necessary condition for 
optimal health expenditure equates the marginal gain from an extra unit of health 
expenditure to its marginal cost, which is 1. 
Finally, the necessary condition for the optimal amount of schooling is: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )




 1 1 1
c
T r t S
S
u c S l u c S l S
c S c S
u c S l S







−⎡ ⎤+ − + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
 (1.9) 
Equation (1.9) implies that marginal gains are equal to marginal costs from an 



























⎛ − ,, , and gain in future earnings discounted to 
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( ))()( +− − ScSc , tuition ( ) ( )Swhl−1ξ , and opportunity cost from forgoing 
working ( )( ) ( )SwhSl +−1 by staying in school. The gap between the utility from 
attending schooling and that from going to work enters because of the jumps of 
consumption and leisure at the time of the switch in stages. The same reason applies to 
the gap of consumptions in equation (1.9). 
The individual optimal amount of schooling and hazard rate are not explicit 
functions of the model’s parameters and the mortality risks of the reference group. In the 
next section, we apply the model to the calibration method and explore to what extent the 
difference in educational attainment between black and white males can be attributed to 
the difference in their mortality risks. It is important to recognize that when studying the 
differential mortality risks between black and white men, it is necessary that the model 
work with age-varying mortality risks since black and white men have different mortality 
risk patterns over their life cycles. 
 
1.3 MORTALITY RISK AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF BLACK AND WHITE 
MEN 
In this section, we apply our earlier model to study the main objective of the 
investigation: to find out to what extent the differences in education between black men 
and white men can be explained by their difference in mortality risks. 
It is well known that mortality risks are different for black and white men. In the 
1979–1981 U.S. decennial life tables, the life expectancy (conditional on surviving to age 
16) is 66.2 years for a black male and 72.1 years for a white male. Relative average 
mortality risks vary for different age groups. For example, for people ages 21–30, the 
average yearly mortality risk is .311% for black men, which is 75% higher than the 
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mortality risk of white men, or .178%. For people ages 31–40, the average yearly 
mortality risk for black men is .440%, which is 159% higher than the mortality risk for 
white men, or .167%.  
In our framework, since an agent’s reference group is subjective, it is difficult for 
researchers to determine an agent’s exact reference group.5 However, in some cases 
researchers should be able to determine what an agent’s reference group is most likely to 
be. For example, given that blacks are very likely to live in neighborhoods with few 
whites (Massey and Denton, 1989), researchers should be confident that the reference 
group of a black male is likely to consist of a majority population of black males; 
similarly, a white male’s reference group should have a preponderance of white males.6   
We use the U.S. decennial life tables in 1979–1981 to represent the mortality risks 
that people in an age group observe when they make their decisions about years of 
schooling. The years of schooling are based on 1990 census data. The average years of 
schooling for black men ages 26–36 who were in the labor force in 1990 were 12.74 
years, while the same group of white men averaged 13.50 years. We concentrate on men 
ages 26–36 in 1990 for two reasons. First, people in this age group have already finished 
their education. Second, since people with less education have higher mortality rates, 
selecting a relatively young group will minimize that sample-selection problem.  
The rest of this section includes three parts. In the first part, we set the baseline 
parameter values for the model to calibrate the optimal years of schooling. In the second 
part, we report the results from calibration compared with the observed years of 
                                                 
5 Some authors argue that groups can be endogenously determined. For example, Fernandez and Rogerson 
(1996) show that individuals endogenously select themselves into different communities or groups 
according to income.  
6 This paper does not investigate why exogenous difference in mortality between blacks and whites exists. 
One possibility is that rampant discrimination in the labor force before the civil rights movement in the 
1960s caused a lower return to education for blacks than for whites. As a consequence, blacks took less 
education and spent less in health care than whites, resulting in a higher mortality risk than that of whites.  
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schooling. In the third part, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses by letting 
parameters deviate from baseline parameter values. 
 
1.3.1 Baseline Parameters and Utility Functional Forms  
Applying the model to explore the effect of mortality differences between black 
and white men on their education differences requires parameterized functional forms for 
mortality risk, utility, and human capital. We first begin by calibrating the production 
function for mortality risk. 
In equation (1.1), the parameter β is the percentage reduction in the average 
mortality risk from one unit of health expenditure. According to Jones (2002), the life 
expectancy in the United States was 66.6 years in 1960 and 73.9 years in 1997. Thus, the 
average yearly mortality risk was approximately lowered from 1/66.6 in 1960 to 1/73.9 in 
1990, a reduction of about 9.88%. In the meantime, the U.S. per capita health expenditure 
rose from $504.60 in 1960 to $2,127 in 1997.  Therefore, a $10,000 increase in health 
expenditure will, on average, reduce mortality risk by: 9.88%*10,000/(2,727 – 504.60) = 
0.445. We take the value of parameter β as 0.445, meaning that a $10,000 health 
expenditure will reduce mortality risk by 44.5%. Note that the current calculation of β 
assumes that the group mortality is constant over time. If we let  be a 
function of health expenditure such that 
)(ˆ tm )(ˆ tm
,0)(/)(ˆ >∂∂ tdtm  the value of β is 
overestimated. In the sensitivity analysis in Section IIIC, we discuss how the outcomes of 
the model vary when β varies. 
To calibrate the value of parameter µ, we rewrite equation (1.1) as the following 
log form: 
)()(ˆlnln)(ln tdtmtm βµ −+= .      (1.10) 
The value of µ can be calculated by taking the mean on the natural log of 
mortality risks across individuals in the reference group. Since  is the group )(ˆ tm
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mortality, i.e.,  we must have[ ] ),(ˆ)( tmtmE = [ ] ctmtmE −= )(ˆln)(ln , where c > 0 (by 
Jensen’s inequality). Since no guidance is offered in the literature on the value of c, we 
calibrate the baseline value µ by assuming that c = 0. In particular, when c = 0, the ratio 
ln(µ)/β matches the mean health expenditure in the reference group.  The baseline value 
of µ is calculated using the U.S. health expenditure ($2,166.50 or 12% of GDP) in 1990.7 
In this case µ =1.101. That is to say that if the individual’s health expenditure is zero, his 
mortality risk is around 10% higher than that of his reference group. If the constant c > 0, 
the parameter µ is smaller. Therefore, the baseline parameter value µ is larger than the 
real parameter value µ. We discuss how the outcomes of the model vary if µ changes in 
the sensitivity analysis in Section IIIC. 
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where the relative risk aversion parameter, σ, is set to 2, and the consumption share in 
utility, α, is set to equal 0.33, as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994).   
Based on the utility function in (1.11), the first-order conditions (1.5) –(1.7) say 
that for any , the consumption is: ),0[ St ∈
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7 U.S. health expenditure data are from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, 





for , the leisure l(t) and consumption c(t) are given by equations (1.14) and 
(1.15): 
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at the switching point from working to retirement, T, the consumption satisfies: 
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( )( )
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and for , the consumption is: ],[ NTt ∈
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The optimal amount of schooling satisfies the equation:  
( )



















σα  (1.18) 
Finally, following Bils and Klenow (2000), we let g(t) = η(t+9)-φ. The term (t+9) 
reflects the fact that the agent has finished 9 years of compulsory schooling. The human-













exp tth ,       (1.19) 
where η = 0.32, and φ = 0.58, as in Bils and Klenow (2000). In this setup, the marginal 
return of schooling is decreasing. At the given parameter values, the return of an 
additional year of education is about 9% if a person has just finished nine years of 
compulsory schooling.  
Other parameters used in the calibration are chosen as the following values: the 
time discount factor is 032.0=θ ; interest rate r is 0.04; and the parameter governing the 
education cost ξ  is 0.5, as in Bils and Klenow (2000). The wage rate per hour for one 
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unit of human capital is $1.47, at which a person with nine years of compulsory schooling 
will earn $10 per hour.8 Since there is no guidance in the literature about the value of 
leisure during schooling, we let 4.0=l , i.e., when a person is in school, he uses 60% of 
his expendable time on studying.  
 
1.3.2 Results 
Given the baseline values for various parameters, we can then obtain the optimal 
quantity of schooling, paths for consumption and mortality, and optimal levels of health 
expenditures based on equations (1.12) –(1.18). However, solving this optimization 
problem with mortality risk turns out to be numerically challenging. We restrict the 
analysis to a time independent health expenditure, i.e., d(t) = d.  This assumption greatly 
simplifies the solution.9  
The results from the baseline parameters are denoted as baseline results. Before 
we present our baseline results, a simple normalization is worth mentioning here. In our 
analysis, the unit of time is one year, denoted as 1. All reported parameter values in our 
study (in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 and in Figures 1.1 and 1.2) correspond to this. In order to 
discuss our result in more intuitive dollar values, we assume that the total hours that an 
agent can allocate between leisure and work in a year is 5,000, reflecting about 13.7 
hours per day.10 The upper panel of Table 1.1 lists the baseline parameter values and the 
lower panel reports the baseline results. The baseline results show that the optimal years 
                                                 
8 Based on Census 1990, the average hourly rate for men with only nine years of schooling is $9.95.  
9 When the health expenditure d is constant across ages, the necessary condition for the optimal health 
expenditure is given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1,0]ln[,
0
−= −−∫ rNc
N v elcudvevpvpvlvcur θβ  
10 If one assumes that the total hours per year are 4,000, then all the dollar values reported in Table 1 and 
Table 2 will be proportionally lower. However, the schooling years are not affected by the total hours per 
year assumed in the model. 
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of schooling is 12.6 years for black men and 13.12 years for white men. Compared to the 
observed 12.74 years of schooling for black men and 13.50 years for white men, the 
predicted schooling years are a little lower and the predicted gap in schooling is 68.4% of 
the observed gap. The average hourly wage rate at the predicted years of schooling is 
$13.38 for blacks and $13.89 for whites. 
The predicted health expenditures from the model are $1,584 for blacks and 
$1,802 for whites. This suggests that white men spend about 20% more than black men in 
health expenditures. Given that the predicted schooling years are lower than the observed 
schooling years, it is not surprising that predicted health expenditures from the model are 
lower than the U.S. per capita health expenditure in 1990 ($2,167).  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the predicted lifetime trajectories of consumption, income, 
wealth and leisure. In Figure 1.1a where the consumption trajectories are shown, one 
interesting observation is the large drop in consumption level at the time of retirement. 
Based on equation (1.7), the marginal utility just before retirement should equal the 
marginal utility just after retirement. Since leisure and consumption are substitutable in 
the given utility function, an increase in leisure due to retirement is compensated by a 
lower consumption of goods. In Table 1.1, blacks spend an average $12,500 in 
consumption per year, while whites on average consume $13,471 per year. Whites 
consume 7.77% more than blacks. 
Figure 1.1b shows lifetime trajectories for net incomes, defined as the labor 
income minus the sum of health expenditures and the cost of schooling. At the working 
stage, blacks’ average labor income is $18,850, while whites’ average income is $20,059. 
Whites’ labor incomes are 6.4% higher than blacks’ labor incomes. For the reason of 
simplicity, our model does not include returns of experience in the accumulation of 
human capital. In our setup, wages for both blacks and whites do not increase after they 
finish school.  
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The wealth trajectories in Figure 1.1c show a familiar life cycle pattern: both the 
black and the white agent borrow to finance their education, save when they work, and 
dissave after they retire. The black agent’s wealth level is lower than the white agent’s 
during most of the life span. The only period when the black agent’s wealth exceeds the 
white agent’s is the period immediately after schooling, since the black agent starts to 
work earlier than the white agent. The maximum wealth for both blacks and whites 
occurs at age 65 when they are about to retire. The maximum wealth level is $307.1K for 
blacks and $360.1K for whites. The lifetime mean wealth level is $97,890 for blacks and 
$116,970 for whites. White men have 19.5% more wealth than black men.  
In the trajectories of leisure in Figure 1.1d, schooling requires more studying 
hours (or less leisure) than working. During the second stage, when people work, the 
labor supply of black men is slightly lower than the labor supply of white men, indicating 
that black men not only have less education, but they also work less. During the working 
stage, the labor supply for the black agent is 2,272 hours per year, while the labor supply 
for the white agent is 2,314 hours.  
In summary, in this model, blacks and whites are the same except in the mortality 
risks of the reference group by which they are categorized. Therefore, all the differences 
in economic outcomes, including consumption, income, wealth, and labor supply, are 
attributed to the differences in mortality risks from the reference groups. More than two-
thirds of the black-white educational difference can be explained by their difference in 
mortality risk. 
   
1.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In the previous subsection, we show that when parameters are given their baseline 
values, the predicted schooling difference is over two-thirds of the observed difference 
between black men and white men. In this subsection, we study whether the baseline 
results hold beyond the particular set of parameter values.  
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The sensitivity analysis is conducted according to the following procedure. We let 
one parameter vary at a time while holding other parameters constant at their baseline 
values. For any new set of parameter values, we re-optimize the whole life-cycle model 
to obtain optimal years of schooling for blacks and whites. For each parameter, we must 
determine a parameter interval in which we may conduct a sensitivity analysis. Selecting 
the parameter interval involves two steps. First, we search the boundary parameter value. 
When the parameter is beyond the boundary value, the additional years of schooling for 
blacks are negative (i.e., the total years of schooling are fewer than the minimum nine 
years of schooling assumed in the study), or no solution can be found. Second, we let the 
middle point of the interval be the baseline parameter value, and we let one end of the 
interval be the boundary parameter value we just selected in the first step. Obviously, the 
interval is determined after one end point and the middle point of the interval are chosen. 
For example, for the time discount rate θ, the baseline parameter is θ = 0.032. First, we 
find out that when θ > 0.034, optimal years of schooling for blacks would be negative. 
Second, when we let θ = 0.034 be the upper boundary of the parameter interval and let θ 
= 0.032 be the middle point, the lower boundary of the interval is then θ = 0.030.  Thus, 
the interval to conduct sensitivity analysis for the time discount rate is [0.030, 0.034]. 
This interval is then divided into 20 equally spaced sub-intervals. There are 21 end points 
of these 20 sub-intervals. We let θ be each of these 21 end points. For each different θ, 
we obtain optimal schooling years and health expenditures. We obtain 21 sets of 
schooling years and health expenditures for both black men and white men, one of which 
is the baseline result.  
With these 21 sets of schooling years and health expenditures, we calculate the 
mean differences and their standard errors in schooling years and in health expenditures 
between black men and white men. This process repeats for other parameters: leisure in 
school ,l cost of education parameter ξ, risk averse parameter σ, mortality production 
parameter β and µ, and the interest rate r. The returns of education are calculated at nine 
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years of schooling. From equation (1.19), there are two parameters that determine the 
return of education. For simplicity, we let only the parameter φ in (1.19) change to obtain 
the parameter interval for the return of education. 
From Table 1.2, we see that the mean differences in years of schooling under 
various experiments are very similar. The observed black-white difference is 0.76 years. 
When we let the time discount rate θ vary between 0.030 and 0.034, the mean difference 
in years of schooling is 0.59, which is a little higher than two-thirds of the observed 
difference. In fact, the mean differences range from 0.537 to 0.646 when all parameters 
except the interest rate vary in their parameter intervals. When the interest rate varies in 
its parameter interval, the mean difference in schooling years is 0.890, which is larger 
than the observed difference in schooling years. We conclude that the impact of mortality 
risk on schooling explains more than two-thirds of the empirical education difference in 
schooling years between black and white men. 
The baseline parameter values for the mortality production function in (1.1) are β 
= 0.445 and µ = 1.101. In Section IIIA, we show that the baseline values likely 
overestimate the actual parameter values. Here we discuss the outcomes of the model if 
either of the two parameters have lower values. We consider lowering the parameter µ. 
For example, if µ is lowered by 20%, i.e., µ = 0.9, the schooling years are 13.10 for 
blacks and 13.62 for whites. The difference between blacks and whites remain the same 
as the baseline case. In fact, if we let ]501.1,701.0[∈µ , the average difference in 
schooling years between blacks and whites is 0.565 with a standard deviation of 0.185. 
The difference in schooling years is quite robust to the value of µ. However, the 
difference in schooling years is more sensitive to the parameter β. For example, if we 
lower β by 20% (while other parameters are at their baseline values) i.e. β = 0.356, the 
schooling years are 12.463 for whites and 12.077 for blacks. Although the difference in 
schooling years is reduced to 0.386 years, it represents a significant portion (50%) of the 
observed difference in schooling years. 
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In addition to the differences in schooling years, Table 1.2 also lists mean 
differences in health expenditures and their standard errors for all other parameters. For 
example, when the time discount rate varies in the interval [0.030, 0.034], the health 
expenditures for blacks vary from $826 (when θ = 0.030) to $1,698 (when θ = 0.034). 
The whites’ health expenditure varies from $1274 (when θ = 0.030) to $2,119 (when θ = 
0.034). The mean difference in health expenditures, when the time discount varies, is 
$565 with a standard error of $152. In fact, a different set of parameters produces a 
different set of health expenditures for both blacks and whites.  
Figure 1.2a-h illustrates the schooling years of blacks and whites when each of the 
parameters varies in its parameter interval. For example, Figure 1.2a shows schooling 
years when the time discount rate θ varies in its parameter interval, [0.030, 0.034], while 
other parameters are held at their baseline values. The schooling years for whites lie 
above the schooling years for blacks. Although the level change of schooling years is 
rather large, from 10.66 years to 13.86 years for blacks and from 11.25 years to 14.62 
years for whites, as the time discount rate increases from 0.030 to 0.034, the difference in 
years of schooling stays roughly the same. The standard error of the average difference in 
schooling years between whites and blacks is 0.038, only about 6% of its mean. 
Therefore, when the time discount rate varies in its parameter interval, the level of 
schooling years is no longer consistent with the observed years of schooling. However, 
the black-white difference in schooling years from our model is consistent with the 
observed difference.  
Similar patterns repeat for four other parameters: leisure in school (Figure 1.2b), 
mortality function parameter µ (Figure 1.2c), the return of education (Figure 1.2d), and 
the cost of education (Figure 1.2e).  When one of these four parameters varies in its 
respective parameter intervals, levels of schooling years vary greatly; however, the mean 
differences (with relatively small standard errors) in black-white schooling years match 
with the observed difference. Therefore, the result showing that the difference in 
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mortality risks can explain much of the black-white difference in schooling years is 
robust for these four parameters.  
For the remaining three parameters, the risk averse parameter σ, the mortality 
production parameter β, and the interest rate r, schooling years for whites always lie 
above those for blacks, indicating that whites always complete more schooling years than 
blacks. In addition, the mean differences match with observed differences in schooling 
years when each of these parameters varies in its respective parameter intervals. 
However, these mean differences in schooling years have a larger variation. For the risk 
averse parameter σ, the difference in black-white schooling years varies from 0.115 (σ = 
2.26) to 0.843 (σ = 1.74). The average difference is 0.537 years with a standard error of 
0.203. For the mortality production parameter β, the difference in black-white schooling 
years varies from 0.103 (β = 0.245) to 0.815 (β = 0.645); the average difference is 0.638 
with a standard error of 0.253. Finally, when the interest varies from 0.026 to 0.054, the 
average difference is 0.890 with a standard error of 0.733. Since the mean differences in 
schooling years from our model are consistently around two-thirds of the observed 
difference in schooling years, we claim that the difference in schooling years for black 
and white men can be substantially explained by the mortality risks. However, such a 
claim is less robust for three out of the eight parameters discussed in the study.  
Finally, from Figure 1.2a – Figure 1.2h, one can find out how choices in 
schooling years change when one of the parameters changes. The figures are rather 
intuitive. When the leisure in school is higher, staying in school becomes more appealing 
and the years of schooling increase (Figure 1.2b). In Figure 1.2c, when the mortality 
production parameter varies, the marginal gain from health expenditures increases. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to have more education in order to afford better health 
expenditures. Similar reasoning applies to Figure 1.2g. A higher return of education 
raises years of schooling (Figure 1.2d), while a higher cost of education lowers years of 
schooling (Figure 1.2e).  In Figure 1.2h, a higher interest rate lowers years of schooling 
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since it raises the opportunity cost of schooling. The intuition in other figures is only 
slightly more complicated. In Figure 1.2a, a higher discount rate lowers years of 
schooling since current utility is valued higher. In Figure 1.2f, a more risk averse person 
has lower years of schooling since he has a higher tendency to avoid risky investment of 
education.    
 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
Tremendous resources have been devoted to reduce the black-white gap. This 
study investigates to what extent the difference in educational attainment between black 
and white men can be explained by the differences in their mortality risks. We develop a 
dynamic life-cycle model with an optimal stopping-point in which group-level mortality 
risk plays an important role in determining individual-level health expenditure, mortality 
risk, and amount of schooling. In the model, an agent’s mortality is a function of his own 
health expenditure and his reference group’s mortality risks. In such a framework, both 
the agent’s years of schooling and mortality risks are endogenous while the reference 
group’s mortality risks are exogenous.  
We let the black male population be the reference group for a representative black 
male and the white male population be the reference group for a representative white 
male. The resulting years of schooling for black and white men are then compared with 
observed schooling for black and white men, respectively. 
We calibrate the model by finding a set of baseline parameter values such that 
optimal schooling years match a large part of the observed years of schooling for both 
black men (12.74 years) and white men (13.50 years). The optimal health expenditures 
are $1,584 per year for a black male and $1,802 per year for a white male, meaning that 
blacks spend about 12% less in health expenditure than whites. We then conduct various 
sensitivity analyses by locally varying parameters. We find that although levels of 
schooling years are sensitive to various parameter values, the difference in schooling 
 23
 
years between blacks and whites is relatively robust in various parameter values. We 
conclude that the mortality difference between blacks and whites is capable of explaining 
their difference in educational attainment.  
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Table 1.1: Baseline Parameter Values and Results 
Parameter description and notation Values 
 Mortality production function:   
 parameter β 0.445 
 parameter µ 1.101 
 Utility function:   
 relative risk averse σ 2.0 
 share of consumption α .33 
 Human capital function:  
 parameter φ 0.58 
 parameter η 0.32 
 Opportunity cost of education ξ  .5 
 Leisure at school l  0.40 
 Time discount rate θ 0.032 
 Interest rate r 0.04 
 Wage rate per unit of human capital w 1.47 
Outcomes of the model Blacks Whites 
 Years of schooling 12.60 13.12 
 (Observed years of schooling) (12.74) (13.50) 
 Health expenditure (in $1,000) 1.584 1.802 
 Average lifetime wealth (in $1,000) 100.9 120.1 
 Average lifetime consumption (in $1,000) 12.500 13.471 
 Average labor income when working (in $1,000) 18.850 20.059 
 Average labor supply when working (in hours) 2,272 2,314 
 Average hourly wage rate (in $) 13.38 13.89 
 
Table 1.2: Sensitivity Analysis 
 Parameter values Outcome of the model 
 












Time discount rate θ 0.032 [0.030, 0.034] 0.590 $565 
   (0.038) ($152) 
Leisure at school l  .40 [0.386, 0.414] 0.610 $589 
   (0.081) ($44) 
Mortality production parameter µ 1.101 [0.701, 1.501] 0.565 $609 
   (0.185) ($300) 
Return of education at 9 years of schooling 0.0913 [0.0888, 0.0938] 0.640 $588 
   (0.034) ($177) 
Opportunity cost of education ξ 0.50 [0.47, 0.53] 0.646 $589 
   (0.0217) ($140) 
Relative risk averse parameter σ 2.0 [1.74, 2.26] 0.537 $612 
   (0.203) ($358) 
Mortality production parameter β 0.445 [0.245, 0.645] 0.638 $653 
   (0.253) ($451) 
Interest rate r 0.04 [0.026, 0.054] 0.890 $624 
   (0.733) ($567) 
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Figure 1.1a: Lifetime Consumption Trajectories 
 





Figure 1.1c: Lifetime Wealth Trajectories 
 




Figure 1.2: Schooling Years as One of the Parameters Varies 
Figure 2a: When time discount rate varies           Figure 2b: When leisure in school varies 
    
Figure 2c: When mortality production parameter µ varies  Figure 2d: When return to education varies 
    
 
Figure 2e: When cost of education varies         Figure 2f: When risk averse parameter varies 
    
 
Figure 2g: When mortality production parameter β varies  Figure 2h:When interest rate varies   






Chapter 2: Estimating Interdependence between Health and Education 
in a Dynamic Model 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The highly positive correlation between health and education has been well 
documented in numerous literatures.1 This finding is robust even after controlling for 
different measures of socio-economic status, such as income and race, and regardless of 
whether health levels are measured by mortality rates, self-evaluation of health status, or 
physiological indicators of health.  
The existing literature offers three types of competing theoretical explanations on 
this correlation. One explanation argues that education increases health by the 
improvement of economic conditions such as gains in per capita income, and/or by the 
efficient effect of information, in that more educated people may have more knowledge 
of health issues (Grossman 1975, Kenkel 1991, Rosenzweig and Schultz 1991). 
Nevertheless, another controversial explanation argues the reverse causality, i.e. better 
health results in more education. Healthier students may be more efficient in studying 
(Perri 1984, Currie and Hyson 1999). Also, better health may increase the demand for 
education because of the resulting longer life expectancy. Finally, the third explanation 
argues the existence of a ‘third factor,’ which affects both health and education in the 
same direction.2  
                                                 
1 See Grossman and Kaestner (1997) for an extensive review. 
2 For example, Fuchs (1982) states that time discount rates could be an explanation for the correlation 
between health and education: patient people would highly value future income and health and thereafter 
invest more in education and spend more time and money on activities related to health, while impatient 
people would invest less in education and health.  
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Certainly, these three explanations are not mutually exclusive. However, from the 
public policy perspective, it is important to distinguish between them and to obtain 
quantitative estimates of their relative magnitudes.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate to what extent, in what strength and 
through which mechanisms health and educational attainment are interrelated. This study 
provides structural estimates of a dynamic programming model of joint decisions of 
young men on schooling, work, health expenditure and savings. The structural estimation 
framework fully imposes the restrictions of the existing theoretical hypotheses on the 
correlation between health and education, and thus the structural approach provides 
rigorous interpretations for the parameters that are estimated. Moreover, because the 
decision rules are explicitly solved by an optimization problem, the estimation permits 
me to evaluate the impacts of policies related to health improvement, such as financial 
support in health expenditure, and other monetary incentives to attend college, such as a 
college tuition subsidy, on an individual’s health status, education outcomes and welfare. 
A common limitation of previous empirical studies on the correlation between 
health and education is that they are based on the models of static setting in which 
education and health are one-shot determined. This method fails to control fully potential 
biases that may arises as a result of the endogeneity of school enrollment, job 
participation or consumption choices. 3  For example, a current school attendance 
decision, which possesses risk as an investment, depends on the probability attached to 
future work choices and mortality risks. Hence, an individual who has low academic 
ability and undergoes a bout of sickness, which creates a higher risk of reaping the wage 
benefits of schooling, may differ systematically from those who have high academic 
ability and are healthy.     
                                                 
3 Finding proper and reliable instruments for both health and educational attainment is very difficult in the 
existing studies.   
 30
 
The static deterministic setting of those models is extended to one in which 
decision makings are sequential and the environment is uncertain. The model allows for 
heterogeneity among youth when they reach age 16 in market skills, study skills and 
health status.4 These differences may be innate or be a result of prior parental and youth 
investment behavior or both. The model is estimated using data from the 1979 youth 
cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79). The data provide 16 
years of longitudinal information on a representative sample of youth beginning at the 
age of 16. The model is fit using data for white males on school enrollment, grade 
transcripts, work status, wages, assets, sickness, and the duration of continuous sickness.  
The model contains a number of mechanisms that can account for interactive 
effects between health and educational attainment. First, health, measured by whether one 
is sick or not and, if so, the duration of the prior sickness, is assumed to affect the 
survival rate from now on. Sickness decreases the survival rate and thus decreases the 
time discount rate, which may consequently result in less school attendance since the 
individual then may highly value current consumption at the expense of investment in the 
future. 
Second, health is assumed to affect academic performance. The probability for an 
individual to pass or fail a grade (if he chooses to attend school at all) depends not only 
on his academic ability but also on his health. Here, health is taken as an important factor 
affecting the productivity of the study. Third, in a related reason, the model assumes that 
health affects wages (assuming that job market participation is voluntary) and home 
productions (assuming that staying home is voluntary), which may account for part of the 
opportunity costs of school attendance. 
                                                 
4 The sample selection of respondents above age 16 is based on the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). First 
passed in 1938 and strengthened in a series of succeeding amendments, FLSA severely restricts the use of 
child labor. According to this legislative regulation, children under the age 16 are strictly restrained to work 
under the conditions that affect their schooling and health.  
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Fourth, the model allows the current health status to affect future health status. 
The individual is assumed to be constantly at risk of sickness. Current health status 
affects future health because it carries an individual’s body and mental information and 
therefore it will impart into future health. Finally, the model assumes the possibility that 
education may affect the chance of getting sick, as more educated people are more 
efficient producers of health.5      
The estimate of the sickness function indicates that education has a positive effect 
on the probability of sickness, however the effect is much less significant than the effects 
of health status and health expenditure. This study also find that health has a substantial 
effect on an individual’s mortality rate, wage, home production, and academic success in 
school. Indeed, health plays an extremely important role in determining an individual’s 
educational attainment. On average, having been sick before the age of 21 decreases the 
years of education attained by 1.4.  
The estimates of the model are applied to perform two policy experiments: a 
direct college tuition subsidy and a high school health expenditure subsidy. To assess the 
efficiency of the policies, These two artificial experiments are allowed to undertake the 
same amount of per capita cost. The results reveal that a health expenditure subsidy 
conditional on high school attendance would have a larger impact on educational 
attainment than a direct college tuition subsidy. In particular, a direct college tuition 
subsidy will favor healthy individuals, especially those healthy and having low academic 
ability, while a subsidy of high school health expenditure will favor sick individuals, 
especially those sick and having high academic ability.        
                                                 
5 The efficiency effect, discussed in detail by Grossman (1999), can take two forms: productive efficiency 
and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency pertains to a situation in which more educated obtain a 
larger health output from given amounts of endogenous (choice) inputs. Allocative efficiency pertains to a 
situation in which schooling increase information about the true effects of the input on health (Kenkel 




It should be emphasized that the results of the estimation rest on a strong 
identification assumption. Most importantly, data limitations require one to make a strong 
assumption in order to identify the health expenditure that is central to the present model. 
In fact, the NLSY does not contain direct observations on health expenditure. Rather, the 
model, in effect, infers the amounts of health expenditures from the individuals’ 
trajectories of asset accumulations, and their choice decisions such as work and school 
attendance.  
A key assumption made to identify the unobserved health expenditure is that only 
the individuals whose incomes are above a minimum level spend on health. Because a 
large body of evidence shows that indigent people make very few health expenditures, 
the minimum level could be interpreted as the income level, below which the individual’s 
primary concern is the consumption of only necessary commodities. Only if the 
individual’s income is beyond the critical level, may he consider spending on health. The 
minimum income level is exogenous to the individual, although it is estimated as a 
parameter from the structure model. Therefore, it is possible to identify the health 
expenditure by comparing the different paths of asset accumulation among high-income 
groups who spend on health and low-income groups who do not.   
The estimation of the model applies the method of generalized indirect inference 
(GII), recently developed in Keane and Smith (2003). The broadly used methodology at 
current stage to deal with the dynamic discrete choice model is maximum likelihood 
(ML) or method of moments (MOM). To estimate the model based on ML or MOM, the 
econometricians have to evaluate the choice probabilities that the individual could make 
on each alternative. It is well known that that evaluation of choice probability is 
computationally burdensome when the number of alternatives is large. This difficulty 
arises because the choice probability is a high dimensional integral over stochastic factors 
that affect the utilities that the individual assigns to each alternative. In the present 
context, the computational problem is formidable for consistent estimation of such 
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models because of severe problems created by unobserved initial conditions and 
unobserved state variables. Most importantly, the NLSY79 does not contain asset 
information for 1979-1984 and 1991. Further, the NLSY79 dose not track the transcript 
record beyond high school.  
GII provides a practical simulation-based approach to estimation of dynamic 
discrete (or discrete/continuous) choice models when there are unobserved variables and 
many alternatives. This approach builds on the indirect inference. The idea of the indirect 
inference is to use a descriptive statistical model to summarize the statistical properties of 
the observed and simulated data from the structural economic model. The method then 
chooses the structural parameters so that the coefficients of the descriptive statistical 
model in the simulated data match as closely as possible those in the observed data. Since 
indirect inference is based on simulated data, it avoids the need to construct the choice 
probabilities generated by the model. However, the implementation of indirect inference 
in a discrete choice model encounters a serious problem because of the non-smooth 
objective function. GII overcomes this obstacle by using a function of the latent utilities 
as the dependent variable in the descriptive statistical model. As the smoothing parameter 
goes to zero, this function delivers the discrete choice implied by the latent utilities, 
thereby guaranteeing consistency.  
The choices made for each individual from age 16 to 31 are simulated to 
implement the GII approach. Individuals differ in their skill endowments, in their health 
status, and in their schoolings. In each period, the individuals made choices among 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: schooling, work, home, net saving, and 
health expenditure. The current health statuses and the current incomes associated with 
work and home have stochastic elements that are known to the individuals at the timing 
of making decisions but are unknown in the last period. Although the individuals do not 
know if they will succeed in school before making the decision of whether or not to 
attend school, they know the probability of passing or failing the grade. Individuals take 
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divergent paths of schoolings, work, home, saving and health expenditures because of the 
cumulative effects of various shocks and because they have heterogeneous skill 
endowments and heterogeneous initial health status. 
The study is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the model, its basic structure, 
solution method, estimation method, and parameterizarion. Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results and describes the policy applications. Section 5 
concludes the study.   
 
2.2 MODEL  
This section presents the structure of the model with the environment settings as 
well as the solution and the structural estimation methods. The model corresponds to the 
decision problem of a young man beginning at age 16. At each period, he decides to enter 
the labor market, go to school, or to stay at home. In addition, he will decide the amount 
of health expenditure and saving (or consumption). His current health status is assumed 
to affect his choice decisions, and in turn that his current choices will affect his future 
health.  
 
2.2.1 Basic structure 
2.2.1.1 Choice set 
The element of an individual’s choice set at each age t consists of a combination 
of work participation, school attendance, home, health expenditure, and asset (or saving, 
and thus consumption).6  is denoted as the 1×3 choice vector for work, school, and 










                                                 
6 I discretize saving and health expenditure in order that the individual’s choice set is entirely discrete, 
which increases the tractability of the problem. 
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to the choice of work, school, and home. More specifically,  if the individual 
chooses to work at period t, otherwise . Similar are  and  to . 
Furthermore, the individual will choose among K fixed number of discrete levels of 









{ }KAAA ∆∆∆ ,,, 21 K , where  is the level of asset, 
and . Denote 1×K vector  as the decision on the level of 
saving with , i.e., if 
A











kA∆  is chosen, otherwise . Thus, 
although (excess) savings fall in this range, the feasible asset may grow with age. It is 
necessary to note that net borrowing is not ruled out in that 
02, =tkd
A∆  may be less than zero. 
Finally, the individual’s choice of health expenditure is divided among the M fixed 
number of discrete levels that are no less than zero: { }Mhhh ,,, 21 K . Denote 1×M vector 
 as the decision on the level of health expenditure with , i.e., if 
 is chosen, otherwise . Hence, the number of the individual’s choice set at 
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2.2.1.2 Environment settings 
In order to understand how the individual chooses alternatives corresponding to 
the current information set and stochastic shocks, it is useful to first describe the 
environment settings. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the order in which stochastic shocks happen and the timing 
when the individuals make choices on alternatives. In the beginning of period t, an 
individual’s health status (sick or healthy) is known and the random shocks of wage and 
home production are realized. Then, the individual chooses alternatives among a 
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combination of work, school, home, and the levels of (excess) saving and heath 
expenditure. Given school attendance, the individual will receive a shock for the grade, 
which will impact his passing or failing the grade. At the end of period t, the agent will 
get a health shock, which together with his prior educational attainment and current 
health expenditure will determine his health in the next period t+1. At the beginning of 
period t+1, the pattern of the timing and the order that shocks occurred in and alternatives 
decided at period t is repeated.  
 
2.2.1.3 Dynamic programming 
At each period t, the individual is assumed to maximize the present discounted 
value of lifetime utility from age 16 (t =1) to a known terminal age, t = T. The value 
function is given by 













tt PcuEV |Max δ       (2.1) 
where E is the expectation operator, tΩ  is the relevant information set known to the 
individual as he enters decision period t, and δ  is the subjective time discount factor. 
 is the contemporary utility at time s.  is the conditional survival 
rate at period s based on the information set at period t. The information set includes age, 
educational attainment (as a proxy for human capital), working experience, health, 
accumulated asset, and contemporaneous shocks from wage and home production. The 
maximization of the objective function (2.1) is achieved by choices of the optimal 
sequence of feasible control variables 
( ) ( )ρρ −= − 1/1ss ccu tsP |
{ }3and,2,1, =ld ls , given current realizations of the 
stochastic shocks.  
The budget constraint for the individual is given by  
( ) ttttttttt hdeduIecdedwAc −>−+=∆+ + 1,21,31,11 *12* ,           (2.2) 
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where  is wage,  is home production including compensation for nonworking, and 
 is the health expenditure. edu is the level of educational attainment and ec is the cost 
of education beyond high school including tuition and the room and board, etc. I is the 
indicator function; it equals one if the argument holds, otherwise it is zero. Attending 
college or graduate school is assumed to incur monetary outlay. Note that in this study, 
educational attainment and years of schooling are two different concepts. Years of 
schooling are the total years that the individual has attended school, while educational 
attainment is the effective years of schooling, i.e., it is the total years of schooling minus 
the number of grades that an individual failed. 
tw te
th
Health expenditure such as spending on appropriate nutrition, vacation and health 
clubs affects an individual’s survival. The individual’s choice decision on health 
insurance and its subsequent effect on an individual’s behavior are not modeled in order 
to make the model tractable7. As stated above, the identification of health expenditure 
comes from a threshold of income. Only after the income is beyond this critical point will 
the individual spend on health. More specifically, denote NIB as the parameter of income 
boundary, so therefore, if , the health expenditure is positive 






Initial conditions include health status in the beginning of the decision horizon, 
the level of educational attainment and the number of years worked (or working 
experience) completed by the beginning of the decision horizon, and the level of asset 
accumulation up to the decision horizon. Both work experience and the level of asset 
accumulation at age 16 are assumed to be zero.  
 
                                                 
7 Insured and uninsured people show many differences in behaviors related to health, including seatbelt use, diet, and exercise. 
Moreover, both the supply and demand for insurance depend on health status, which confounds the causal effect between insurance 
coverage and health. Indeed, credible evidence that access to health insurance causes better health is limited (Newhouse, 1993, Levy 
and Meltzer, 2001).  
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2.2.1.4 Probability of sickness 
Health status in the next decision horizon is uncertain. The probability for the 
agent to be sick in the next period, for example, at age t+1 depends on his age, his present 
health expenditure, , his educational attainment, , and his present health status. 
Assume that the probability of sickness follows Probit. Define 
th tedu
( ) Sttttttt slDeduhageH 154132111 ++++ +++++= εβββββ ,        (2.3) 
where  is serially independent standard normal. The parameter St 1+ε 3β  reflects the idea 
that more educated people might have efficient knowledge on health issues and thereby 
refrain from activities that are harmful to health.  is an indicator for sickness at age t, 
i.e.,  if the agent is sick at age t, otherwise 
tD
1=tD 0=tD .  is the continuous 
duration of prior sickness up to age t. For example, 
tsl
0=tsl  if 01 =−tD , and  if 
 and . Then 
1=tsl
11 =−tD 02 =−tD
sick if , 01 >+tH
not sick if 01 ≤+tH . 
 
2.2.1.5 Survival rate  
Heath, which is measured by whether the individual is sick or not and if so the 
duration of the prior sickness, affects the individual’s survival rate. Suppose that being 
sick at age t increases an individual’s mortality risk, mt. The mortality rate function, 
which is based on the life table, is given by 























,      (2.4) 
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where α are parameters,  is the mortality rate of life table at age t. Parameter tm̂ 2α  
measures the effect of the duration of prior sickness on the individual’s mortality if the 
individual was sick at the current age. The expression of mortality rate implies that if the 
agent recovers from a previous period of illness, his current mortality risk will not be 
affected by his sickness during the previous period. The survival rate at t, conditional on 




















ts            (2.5)  
It is important to point out that education, income and wealth will affect the 
survival rate indirectly through their effects on heath expenditure, although they are not 
included in the mortality function. In fact, NLSY79 does not collect the information on 
the survival rate in each age. The identification of the survival rate comes from the 
solution of structural model. 
 
2.2.1.6 Passing or failing a grade 
Academic progress is uncertain given school attendance. Assume that whether the 
individual passes or fail a grade depends on his (unobserved) academic type: high or low 
intelligence. It is also contingent on his health. The chance to pass or fail the grade 
follows Probit. Let 
( ) ( Gttt
k





0 )     (2.6) 
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where ξ  are parameters. Summation is over study type, where 1 and 2 indicate high and 
low skill, respectively.  is a serially independent random shock following standard 
normal distribution.8 Then 
G
tε
pass if 0>Φ t , 
fail if 0≤Φ t . 
 
2.2.1.7 Wage 
Assume that wage is a logarithm function of educational attainment (or effective 
schooling years), , work skill type (high or low), work experience, , which is 






















3210ln      (2.7) 
where the parameter 7γ  is the adjustment cost if the individual didn’t work in the 
previous period. Unobserved types are incorporated into the wage function in order to 
reflect the effect of different market skills on wages. Note that the wage rate is standard 
Mincirian, except for the health terms.     
 
                                                 
8 The unobserved random variable may include the individual’ level of motivation in study, and the quality 
of the teacher.  
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2.2.1.8 Home production 
Home production, the reward for remaining home, is unobserved to 
econometricians, and includes the compensation and any output the individual made. It is 
assumed that home production depends on an individual’s health and is given by 
( ) etttt slDee εφφ +++= 21            (2.8)  
where e  is constant, and φ  are parameters. The within-period joint distribution of 
shocks  and  is assumed to be serially independent and follows . Since 
the NLSY79 does not provide the information on home production, to identify the home 




tε ( Λ,0N )
)
 
2.2.2 Solution method 
The maximization problem can be set into a dynamic programming problem 
framework. The value function can be written as the maximum over alternative-specific 
value functions, each of which obeys the Bellman equation: 
( ) ({ }ψψ ;max; tititt VV Ω=Ω Γ∈          (2.9) 
where ψ  is the vector of parameters of the structural model. Γ is the Cartesian product 
set of alternatives , which consists of 
321 ddd ××=Ζ MK ××3 elements. The state 
space is { }etwtttttttttt slDdddAepedu εε ,,,,,,,,, 3 12 11 1 −−−=Ω  (Note that the grade shock, 
, is not included in the state space, because , as described in the environment 
settings, is only certain to the individual after the choice decision on school attendance 
has been made. The health shock, , is known to the individual prior to the choices 
decisions and its information is reflected in the indication of sickness, .) The 








( )ψ;titV Ω , is given by 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]





















  (2.10) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] TtZVEmuV iTTTTTTitiT ==ΩΩ−+Ω=Ω ++ ,1,;1;; 1* 1 ψδψψ     (2.11) 
where  represents the contemporary utility if the alternative i is chosen (i.e. 
).  is the terminal function and will be discussed later. The second equation 
refers to the notation in Keane and Wolpin (1994) for convenience. More specifically, 
 can be written by   
( ψ;tiu Ω )
1=itZ * 1+TV
tE max
( ) ( )[ ]




















        (2.12) 
if school attendance was not chosen, i.e. . And 0
1
,2 =td
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]

















































if school attendance was chosen, i.e. . 1
1
,2 =td
The elements of the state space evolve according to 
1



































1tD                                         (2.14.4) 
),(1 tttt DslDsl +=+                                           (2.14.5) 
and finally, ’s are serially independent. 1+tε
Given the finite horizon, the solution method is conducted through backward 
recursion. The difficulty with this procedure is the well-known “curse of dimensionality” 
problem. When the dimension of the state space and the choice set are large, the solution 
of the model becomes formidably difficult in terms of computation time and memory. 
The high dimensional problem is particularly severe in the present structural model. At 
each period, the choice set  contains 405 (3×15×9) elements.9 As the 
decision periods increase, the state space increases exponentially. An approximation 
method developed in Keane and Wolpin (1994) is adopted to tractably deal with this 
problem. Specifically, the Emax approximated function is a polynomial of the state space 
elements. First, at each period t, the Emaxt function is computed at a randomly selected 
subset of the state space points by using Monte Carlo integration to simulate the required 
multivariate integrals. Second, a regression function is estimated as a polynomial in those 
state space points. Finally, the Emax values at the non-simulated state space points are 
interpolated by using the predicted values from the regression.  
321 ddd ××
Finally, the terminal condition has to be specified to solve the maximum problem. 
The recursion begins at a computationally convenient age, T = 31, to avoid the 
computational burden of solving the model over a very long horizon. Also, the 
polynomial form of the Emax function at that age is used as the terminal condition: 
                                                 
9 15 possible values for net asset savings are + (7500, 5000, 3000, 2000, 1000, 500) and 0, 10000 and 
15000. 9 possible values for health expenditure are 0, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 3,000, 5000, 7,500.  
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The parameters of this terminal function are estimated along with the structural 
parameters of the model.  
 
2.2.3 Estimation method 
The application of GII to estimate the dynamic programming problem (2.9) can be 
implemented in three steps. The first step is to estimate the descriptive statistical model 
using the observed data. Denote { } Tty Niit ,,1,1 K==  as the observed choices and 
outcomes from the structural model (2.9) with the parameters 0ψ . The observed choices 
include job participation, school attendance, or remaining at home, while the outcomes 
include discrete variables of progress in school (passing or failing the grade) and 
healthy/sick status, and continuous variables of wages and assets. It should be known that 
because of the missing and unobserved variables, the content of  may be different 
over individuals and over periods of time. For example, wages are sometimes unobserved 
and data for progress in college and graduate school were not collected in the NLSY79, 
in which case, at some specific period t some individuals’ observed data set yit might 
include wages and/or progress in school, but some might not. In addition, for the years 
1979-1984 and 1990, the NLSY79 does not contain asset data, therefore up to age 21,10 
no asset data are in , and after that age some individuals’ observed data 
might include asset information while some might not. The details of the descriptive 
ity
{ } 5,,1,1 K== ty
N
iit
                                                 
10 The 14-16 years old cohort in 1979 was among 21 –23 years old in 1986 when the data on asset were 
first collected. Thereby, the youngest age at which some individuals started to have asset information is 21.  
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statistical model and the selections of dependent and independent variables by ages and 
by observed data are described in the Appendix A.     
Denote the likelihood function associated with the descriptive statistical model as 
, where  is the vector of regressors in the 
descriptive statistical model for individual i at time period t, which is described in the 
Appendix A; y is the set of observed choices, 







,;,; θ ) itx
{ }ity ; z is the observed exogenous 
individuals’ initial variables, including heath status, educational attainment, working 
experience (0) and asset (0);  is the parameter set Θ { }Ttt 1=θ . The estimation of the 
descriptive statistical model using observed data gives the parameters 
( Θ=Θ
Θ
,;maxargˆ zyL )                          (2.16) 
The second step is to estimate the descriptive statistical model using the simulated 
data of choice decisions and outcomes over the decision horizons from the structural 
model. Given the initial condition z and the structural parameters ψ , the structural model 
can be used to generate F statistically independent simulated data sets , where 
, ; N is the number of observations. The vector of 
( ){ }Nifity 1~ =ψ
Ff K,1= Tt ,,1K= ity~  corresponds 
to that of  in the case that they consist of the same type of elements such as choice 
decisions (school, work or home, ), indicators for the passing of a grade and 




tD tw tA ( ){ }Nifity 1~ =ψ  is based on the 
above described solution method of the simulation and interpolation for computing 
Emax. Each of the F simulated data sets is constructed using the same set of observed 
exogenous individuals’ initial variable z. The difference of each simulated data set results 
solely from the different sequences of error draws, which are held fixed for different 
values of the parameter ψ . 
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Each of the simulated data sets can then be applied to estimate the descriptive 
statistical model. However, it is not practical computationally to simply plug in the 
simulated discrete variables into the descriptive statistical model because of the non-
smooth objective function (actually its surface is a step function).11 Applying the idea of 
GII proposed in Keane and Smith (2003), a series of latent utility is used to substitute the 




























,1       (2.17) 
in place of simulated 1,1
~
td , where 1Ξ  is a subset of alternative set Γ  and consists of all 
the alternatives in which job participation is chose. Because the latent utilities are smooth 
functions with parameters ψ , ( λψ ; )
~~1
,1 td  is a smooth function of ψ . Moreover, as the 
smooth parameter λ  goes to 0, ( λψ ; )
~~1
,1 td  goes to 1 if an alternative with job 
participation has the highest latent utility and to 0 otherwise.      





























d        (2.18) 
is used in place of simulated 1,2
~
td , where subset 2Ξ  consists of all the alternatives in 
which school attendance is chosen. As the smooth parameter λ  goes to 0, ( )λψ ;
~~1
,2 td  
                                                 
11 The reason for the difficulty in practice is discussed in detail in Keane and Smith (2003): ‘small changes 
in the structural parameters ψ  will cause the simulated data jump discretely and such a discrete change 
caused the parameters of the descriptive model fit to the simulated data to jump discretely. This jump, in 
turn causes the metric of distance between the descriptive models estimated on the observed and simulated 
data to jump discretely too. The algorithms to deal with the minimization of a non-smooth function perform 
very poorly.’    
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goes to 1 if an alternative with school attendance has the highest latent utility and to 0 
otherwise.   
Wages are observed if and only if the individuals worked during that period. To 
make the simulated wage match the observed wage, the observed wage is applied for 
those individuals who worked at that period, and set the wage to zero for those 
individuals who did not work at that period. ( ) (ψλψ itt wd ~; )
~~1
,1  is used in place of the 
simulated wage ( )ψitw~ . Since both ( λψ ; )
~~1
,1 td  and ( )ψitw~  are smooth functions of ψ , 
the estimated parameters of the descriptive statistical model using the simulated data are 
also smooth functions of ψ . Moreover, as the smoothing parameter λ  goes to 0, 
( ) (ψλψ itt wd ~; )
~~1
,1  goes to ( )ψitw~  if an alternative with job participation choice has the 
highest latent utility and to 0 otherwise.  
Furthermore, because the indicator of sickness is a discrete variable, it need be 
substituted by a continuous function. Function  


















D        (2.19) 
is used in place of simulated 1
~
+tD . Thus, as the smooth parameter λ  goes to 0, 
( λψ , )~ 1+tD  goes to 1 if  > 0 and to 0 otherwise.  1+tH
Finally, according to the same reason for the discrete variable of sickness, the 
continuous function ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]λψλψ /exp1/exp tt Φ+Φ  is used in place of the indicator 
for passing a grade.  
Denote ( ){ Nifity 1; }~~ =λψ , t = 1, …, T, and f = 1, …, F, as the modified simulated data 
smoothed by using the functions of the latent utilities. The descriptive statistical model 
then can be estimated using each of the simulated smoothed data to obtain the following 
parameters    
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( ) ( )( )Θ=Θ
Θ
,;;~~maxarg;
~~ xzyL ff ψλψ .            (2.20) 





1∑ = Θ=Θ λψλψ . As the 
sample size N goes to large and the smooth parameter λ  goes to small (zero), ( )λψ ;
~~Θ  
converges to a nonstochastic “binding” function ( )ψΗ  (Gourieroux, Monfort, and 
Renault (1993) and Keane and Smith (2003)). The next step of the GII is to get an 
estimate ψ̂  of the structural parameters so as to make ( )ψ̂Η  and  as close as 
possible.     
Θ̂
The third step is to estimate the structural parameter ψ  by minimizing a metric 
function, which measures the distance between  and Θ̂ ( λψ ; )
~~Θ . In the present context, 
The likelihood ratio is adopted as the metric function, which is used in Keane and Smith 








~~,;maxargˆ zyL         (2.21) 
In regards to the practical algorithm for the estimation of the structural model, this 
study adopts the two-step approach following Keane and Smith (2003). The details of 
choosing the number of simulated data sets F and the smoothing parameter λ  of each 
step are described in the Appendix A.   
Finally, the generation of an individual’s skill endowments is described as 
follows. The endowment skills at age 16 are assumed to be unobserved to the 
econometricians. But the population proportions of the skill types are known.12 Denote 
                                                 
12 Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997) undertake the same assumption. Some literatures use the Armed Forces 
Qualifying Test (AFQT) as a measure of IQ or endowment skill (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Cameron and 
Heckman, 1998, 1999). The reason that this analysis does not adopt AFQT is based on the following basics: 
(1) AFQT reflects not only the innate endowment but also the parents and own investments in skills up to 
the time of the test. But, due to the age distribution of the samples in the NLSY79, small portion of the 
individuals took the test prior to age 16. (2) Given that each individual is characterized by two skills 
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the type portions of high ability for studying and high skill for working as  and , 
respectively. An individual’s skill types can be simulated by random draws from the 
uniform distribution between 0 and 1. For example, if an individual i’s drawn number 
corresponding to the study type is less than , the individual is labeled as having high 
academic ability. Otherwise the individual is labeled as having academic ability. At each 






The dataset used for the structural model estimation is from the 1979 youth cohort 
of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY79). The NLSY79 contains 
extensive information about the individuals’ employment, education, health, income and 
asset. An original 12,686 individuals, a nationally representative sample, were 
interviewed each year from 1979 to 1994. After 1994, the interviews switched to every 
other year.  
The analysis is based on the sample of the white males who were age 16 or 
younger as of October 1, 1977 and never sworn into active military service. Basically, 
this study rules out the choice of military. This study follows each individual in the 
sample from the first year they reach age 16 as of October 1 that year through September 
30, 1993.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 





In each survey year, the NLSY79 asked the individuals a standard set of health 
questions. The focus of these questions was on the health problems that affected the 
respondent’s ability to work.13 In each year, if the respondents were not currently 
working, they were asked if their health would (was) prevent(ing) them from working, 
and the rests of respondents working currently were asked if their health limited the type 
and the amount of work they could do. If a health limitation was reported, the NLSY79 
then probed for the month and year the health limitation began. 
This study uses the answers to these questions to construct the health variables for 
this analysis.14 An individual was classified as sick in a given year if a health limitation 
was reported at that year. The construction of the sick duration variable is based on the 
information of the individual’s reported date of when the sickness began. The difficulty 
in constructing health variables is that a large portion, around thirty percent, of the self-
reported sick duration in the NLSY79 did not match the preceding self-reported sickness. 
For example, some respondents reported that the sickness began at some earlier point, 
say, two years ago, but no reported health limitation could be found during the last 2 
years. This could be because that no surveys were conducted for these respondents at that 
periods, or because that the respondents had not been aware of the sickness until the 
health limitations developed into a serious problem affecting their lives. To solve this 
inconsistent problem, I check the subsequent self-reported answers to health questions, 
also searching for references to the specific ailments. If the respondents kept reporting the 
same health problems and the same date the heath limitation began, I then use this 
                                                 
13 People currently in school may intend to report a healthy situation and therefore cause bias. But it is not 
clear what kind of bias it will make. To deal with this issue is beyond this study scope.  
14 More specific details on the health ailment were asked in the NLSY79 if the individuals gave an 
affirmative answers to being limited in either the kind or amount of work they could do because of health. 
However, the afterwards tremendous computation of the structural model restraints me from considering 
these individual’s specific health problems. 
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information to update the prior sickness variables. If the specific health problem only 
reported once but the duration was longer than one year during the entire time of the 
survey, I simply classify the respondent as sick only during that reported year.  
In the constructed health data, twenty one percent of the respondents report at 
least one illness during the 16 years of surveys. The average duration is 2.28 years. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents who reported sickness at each age from 16 
to 29.15 At the early age of 16, 4.14% of the white males in the samples consider 
themselves sick. Over the subsequent 15 years, the percentage of the respondents 
reporting an illness increases steadily, peaking at the age of 29 with 5.17%.  
 
2.3.2 Schooling, work, or home 
At each interview date, the NLSY79 asked the respondents about their enrollment 
status, the highest grade attended and completed, school-leaving dates, and the dates that 
diplomas and degrees were received. An individual is considered as attending school 
during the year if the individual reported enrollment in school at the time of the survey 
and did not report dropping out of school during that year in the subsequent surveys.    
Employment data in the NLSY79 include the beginning and ending dates of all 
jobs, hours worked on each job (to the calendar week), and salary paid on each job. An 
individual is considered to have worked during the year if the individual reported 
working at least 1000 hours, i.e. at least 20 hours per week on average for 50 weeks. 
An individual is considered to be at home during the year if the individual neither 
was enrolled in school nor worked during the year. Note that some individuals would be 
                                                 
15 The figure ends at age 29 instead of 31. The percentages of sickness report at age 30 and age 31 are 
4.81% and 5.18%, respectively. A dip at age 30 and the breaking of the increase trend may come from the 
shrinking of sample size. During the annual survey from 1979 to 1993, 98.4% of the original respondents 




classified as being at home if they worked during the year but did not work at least 1000 
hours.  
Table 2.1 presents the choice distributions of white males by age for the whole 
sample and for the sickness data. The sickness data are cumulative, i.e., at each age t, it 
consists of the individuals who have reported being sickness at least once up to and 
including age t. The initial number of individuals is 1,062 at age 16. From age 16 to age 
29, the number declines slightly as a result of sample attrition such as natural decease. 
The fall of the sample size during age 30 and 31 is because some samples never reach 
their older ages during the survey periods. Overall, there are 15,972 person-periods in the 
whole sample dataset and 2,198 person-periods in the sickness dataset. As the table 
shows, the choice decisions on school attendance, job participation, or remaining home 
are highly dependent on the individual’s health. Compared to the individuals in the whole 
sample, individuals in the sickness data at each age have a smaller percentage of school 
attendance and in contrast they have a larger percentage of remaining home. Moreover, 
although a slightly larger percentage of individuals in the sickness data worked during the 
first three ages, a relatively smaller percentage of sick individuals worked after that. More 
specifically, 11.56% of the individuals among the sickness data attended school, 42.81% 
worked, and 45.63% remained at home. The corresponding percentages for the 
individuals among the whole sample are 25.34%, 54.46%, and 20.20%. Furthermore, the 
relative difference in the percentage of school attendance between the two data sets 
increases during the normal schooling ages. For example, at age 16, the percentage of 
individuals attending school while having been sick is 81.82% (i.e., 93.6% of the average 
87.38%), but at the normal high school graduation age of 18, that percentage drops to 
38.55% (i.e., 77.2% of the average 49.95%), and at the normal college graduation age of 
22, it drops to 11.51% (i.e., 60.01% of the average 19.18%). Additionally, the propensity 
to work increases monotonically over the first 11 years of both data sets, followed by 
slight fluctuations over the last 5 years.  
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3, which respectively show one-period transition rates for the 
whole sample and sickness data in the process of making choices, reveal substantial state 
dependence for health status. The row percentages describe the transition percentages 
conditioned on the prior state, and the column percentages show transition percentages 
conditioned on the succeeding state. State persistence is revealed in the Tables 2.2 and 
2.3. A large majority of the individuals who enrolled in school in the last period will 
enroll currently, however over 73% of the whole sample and less than 60% of sickness 
sample will make such a decision. Also, individuals who worked or remained home last 
period have the same pattern as those who enrolled, and thus will work or be home at this 
period. Moreover, the individuals who have been sick before are more likely to remain 
home if they were at home during the last period, and are less likely to work if they 
worked last period.  
 
2.3.3 Passing or failing grades 
The NLSY79 collected the information of the high school transcripts during 1980, 
1981, and 1983 for those respondents who were 17 years of age or older including those 
who dropped out from high school, and who were expected to complete high school in 
the United States. The transcript data gathered for each of up to 64 courses include grade 
level at which the course was taken, a code for the high school course, a grade for each 
course based on a 0 to 4.0 scale, and the credits received. 
To conduct the dummy variable for an individual passing or failing a grade, I 
simply assume that an individual failed a grade if and only if the individual failed over a 
half of the courses taken in that grade. This assumption implies that each course is 
equally important for assessing the progress in school. Because no clear guideline or 
uniform standard exists for weighting the grade of each course, the current assumption 
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provides a feasible way to evaluate the performance of study in school. Further, a course 
is classified as failure for an individual if its grade is lower or equal to F.  
Table 2.4 shows the percentages of failing in high school by grade for the whole 
sample and for the sickness data. The sickness data consists of the respondents who 
reported health limitation at least once up to and including the year the grade was taken. 
As shown in the Table 2.4, health limitation significantly influences the outcome of 
study. For the same reason that health problems could limit the type and amount of work 
an individual could do, health also affects the grades an individual could attain by 
affecting the efficiency of an individual’s effort at study. Specifically, the possibility of 
failing a grade declines as the grade level becomes higher, from 13.9% in grade 9 to 
3.63% in grade 12. The declining trend in grade failures may reflect the fact that some 
students could not complete high school and dropped out of school before graduation 
because of bad grades, health problems, or both. In addition, the possibility of failing a 
grade for the individuals who had been sick is more than twice than the average, except 
for the grade 9 in which the failing possibility is about 1.5 times higher.   
 
2.3.4 Wage and asset 
The real wages used in this analysis are based on 1984 price level. On average, an 
individual who was sick during the surveys of 16 years will make his wage decrease 
about 10%. More specifically, the average wage in the whole data is $20,752 with a 
standard deviation of $47,535, in contrast to an average wage of $18,731 in the sickness 
data, with a standard deviation of $11,367. 
Beginning in 1985, the NLSY79 launched a much larger wealth section. Up to 20 
questions about a variety of asset and debt holdings were asked to the respondents at each 
subsequent interview, except for 1991.16 The asset items used in this analysis include (i) 
                                                 
16 The wealth questions were eliminated in 1991 round of survey because of the budgetary restrictions. 
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residential property, (ii) cash savings, stock and bond portfolio, etc., (iii) real estate, 
assets in the business, and farm operation, (iv) automobile, (v) mortgage debt, property 
debt, and other accumulated debt, (vi) other assets each worth individually more than 
$500, (vii) other debts over $500. Together these variables provide an analog of the net 
worth of the assets of each respondent. In actuality, the NLSY79 did not distinguish the 
assets of the respondents from those of their spouses. The respondents were asked the 
amount of the asset owned or owed by the respondents and/or the spouses. To construct 
the net asset belonging to the respondent in a survey year, I check the respondent’s 
answer to the question: “are you currently married and is your spouse listed on the 
household enumeration?” If the answer is no, his net asset is the value calculated from the 
above items; otherwise, his net asset is cut in half.   
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show the asset distribution by age for the whole sample 
and the sickness data, respectively. The earliest age with reported assets is 21 because the 
asset data were not collected until 1985, and the age range selected in this analysis is 
from 14 to 16 in 1979. Given the small size of the observations and possible 
measurement errors, outlier asset levels, which are dependent on age, are deleted.17 As 
shown in the tables, both mean and median net assets in sickness data are smaller than 
those in the whole data, reflecting the substantial and persistent influence of sickness on 
the accumulation of assets. The prevalent dependence of assets on health is also verified 
by the proportions of the negative net assets, which are higher in the sickness data from 
the ages 22 to 31. In addition, tables 2.5 and 2.6 indicate that assets increase with age. 
Between the ages of 21 and 31 in the whole sample and sickness data, the mean net assets 
increase by 4.13 and 2.90 times, respectively, while the median net assets increase by 
3.75 and 3.63 times, respectively. Moreover, the median net assets are, on average, less 
                                                 
17 In total, 107 extremely large and small net asset observations are gotten rid of from the whole data, 
while 34 from the sickness data. 
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than half of the mean levels. This reflects the positively skewed nature of the asset 
distribution.        
 
2.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS  
2.4.1 Parameter estimates 
The parameter estimates are reported in table 2.7. The standard deviations are in 
parentheses. In total, the number of parameters is 50. The parameters are estimated to fit 
the sequential choices of 15,972 person-period observations, out of which 2,198 had been 
sick at least once through the 16-year surveys. The choice set at each period consists of 
decisions on school attendance, job participation, or staying at home, decisions on net 
asset savings and health expenditure, and received wages.  
The estimated parameters for the mortality rate function show that a healthy 
individual’s mortality is 1.5% lower from the value of life table, while the mortality rate 
for an individual who has experienced sickness with zero duration is 21 times larger than 
the life-table mortality and the mortality rate rises to 22 times as large as the life-table 
mortality if the sickness duration is 3.5 years. As for the survival rate, being sick at age 
16 with 0 duration decreases the survival rate between age 16 and 30 by 2% from 98.4% 
to 96.4%.  
The estimates for passing or failing a grade indicate that health and academic skill 
endowment have a significant effect on the success of an individual in each grade. 
Among the individuals with high academic ability who account for 86.5% of the 
population, the probability for a healthy individual to pass a grade is 97.6%, while the 
corresponding probability for a sick individual with zero duration and a sick individual 
with 3-year duration drops to 91.2% and 90.88%, respectively. On the contrary, of the 
individuals with low academic ability, the probability of passing a grade is 75.4% if he is 
healthy and 53.3% if he is sick with zero duration. In general, health plays a more 
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important role for an individual of low academic ability in whether or not he will pass the 
grade than for an individual of high academic skill. Specifically, the passing probability 
of an individual with high academic skills will decrease by 6.4% as a consequence of a 
sickness, whereas the probability of failure with low academic skill will decrease by 
22.8%.  
The estimates for wage equation parameters reveal that sickness reduces wages by 
16%. In addition, individuals with high working skill (approximately 59% of the 
population) earn about 30% more than low working type individuals if other 
characteristics are the same. Furthermore, the job adjusting cost and the returns for 
education, experience and age match the empirical estimate results: the absence of work 
in the last period decreases wages by 13%; an additional year of education increases 
wages by 10%; an additional year of experience increases wages by 11% in the first year 
and after that an additional year of experience increases wages by 10.85-2*0.4*ept 
percent, which implies that wages reach a peak after 13.6 years (other things kept 
constant); wages decrease 0.7% per year. 
With respect to the home production function, estimated parameters show that 
sickness reduces the home production by $2716, and an additional year of duration 
reduces the home production $368. The average home production for a healthy individual 
is $9689. Additionally, wage shock and home production shock are negatively correlated 
with the correlation coefficient -0.3816. 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9, based on the estimated parameters, report the probabilities of 
being sick at selected ages, health expenditures, health statuses, and educational 
attainments. As the tables show, both health expenditure and heath status have significant 
effects on the possibility of sickness, however the effect of education on the possibility of 
sickness is relatively much smaller. Table 2.8 takes a fixed 10-grade educational 
attainment. It shows that a healthy individual has around a 50 percent chance of getting 
sick if he does not spend on any health activity, while a sick individual has a high 
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probability of more than 87 percent of getting sick. At age 16, a $500 health expenditure 
helps a healthy individual reduce the probability of sickness 81%, from 48% to 9%, and 
the relative reducing strengths for sick individuals fall between 49% and 31%, decreasing 
with the increase of sickness duration. At more advanced ages, the effect of health 
expenditure drops slightly, for example, aged 30, with a $500 health expenditure, an 
individual’s probability of sickness is reduced 78% if healthy and 44% if sick. Therefore, 
relative to health expenditure and health status, the aging effect is pretty small for the 
possibility of sickness.  
The estimated effect of education on the probability of sickness in table 2.9 is 
divided into grades 8, 12 and 16, which represent the education level of pre-high school, 
high school graduate, and 4-year college graduate, respectively. Table 2.9 shows that 
education has a negative effect on the probability of sickness, although the effect is much 
less significant than heath expenditure and health status. Specifically, if there is no health 
expenditure, the probability of sickness for a 20-year-old and healthy individual at eighth 
grade is 51%, and at grades 12 and 16, the corresponding probabilities of sickness drop to 
48% and 45%, respectively.  
Finally, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 0.8043 and preference discount 
factor is 0.9795, which are consistent with values in the literature. The estimated cost of 
education beyond high school is $4, 328 per year. And, the net income boundary is -$585, 
below which the health expenditure is zero. 
 
2.4.2 Within-sample fit 
With the estimated parameters, the validation of the model can be tested by the 
within-sample fit. Based on a simulation of 8,000 individuals, table 10 compares the 
predicted and actual values of selected state variables divided by the sickness and the 
whole data. As can be seen, the model accurately matches the mean level of completed 
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schooling years in the whole data. However, the disaggregation of completed schooling 
years shows that the model overstates the proportion of those having completed twelve 
years of schooling (high school) and understates the proportion of those having 
completed sixteen years of schooling (college). In the sickness data, the model predicts a 
slightly higher mean level of completed schooling years and overstates the proportion of 
those having completed twelve years of schooling. 
The model fits the mean percentage of decision choices on work, school and 
home quite well, except that it overstates the mean fraction of school attendance in the 
sickness data and understates the mean fraction of work decision in the whole sample 
data. A further fit comparison on the predicted and actual age patterns of school 
attendance, work decision and home decision for the whole sample and sickness data is 
illustrated in figures 2.3 and 2.4.   
In fitting the percentage of those failing a grade, the model predicts a relatively 
stable percentage of failure in each of the grade level: around 5% in whole set of data and 
16-17% in the sickness data. Moreover, the predicted probability of failure in each grade 
is over 11% higher in the sickness data than in the whole data. 
With respect to the asset fit, the model captures the broad increasing pattern of 
age. Figure 2.4 displays the predicted and actual mean asset by age. It is clear that the 
predicted mean levels of assets are quite closer to the actual levels for the whole sample 
data than for the sickness data. 
As predicted by the model, the mean health expenditure in the sickness data is 
5.4% larger than in the whole set of sample data. This is because that sick individuals 
have to spend more on health to reduce the chance of being sick in proceeding periods, 
and healthy individuals can spend small amounts on health activity and still maintain a 
relatively low probability of sickness. Figure 2.5 shows the predicted and actual 
percentages of sick individuals respectively among the simulated date and the whole 
sample data, which are around 4.1% to 5.2%. The largest and smallest gaps between 
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predicted and actual sick percentages are 0.29% at age 30 and 0.02% at age 27, 
respectively. Moreover, the age pattern of health expenditure and the percentage of zero 
health expenditure are portrayed in figure 6. It is shown that the mean health expenditure 
increases by age, from $783 at age 16 to $952 at age 31, an average increase of 1.34% per 
year. Concurrently, the ratio of zero health expenditure increases from 0 in the first four 
years (i.e. ages 16 to 19) to 0.94% at age 30. Note that according to the model 
assumption, as the individual’s net income is lower than the boundary, -$549, his health 
expenditure is zero. The increase trend of the percentage of zero health expenditure 
implies the dispersion of assets and earnings. 
 
2.4.3 Initial health status and education effects  
As has been observed, an individual’s initial characteristics have a significant 
effect on his future behaviors of alternative choices, which will subsequently determine 
his health, educational attainment and wealth. It is interesting to investigate how the 
education, health and welfare are related to initial levels of completed education and 
health status at the age of 16.  
Table 2.11 reports the simulation results of initial health status effects on selected 
variables, conditional upon initial schooling. Approximately 5% of individuals completed 
10 years or more schooling by age 16 in the observation sample. As seen in the table, 
initial health status is an important determinant of education, survival probability, asset, 
health expenditure and lifetime welfare. Moreover, the effects of initial health limitations 
are more substantial for individuals with lower levels of education than for individuals 
with higher level of education. For instance, illness at age 16, on average, decreases the 
average level of education at age 30 by 0.35 year for individuals with initial schooling of 
nine years or less, whereas by 0.27 year for individuals with initial schooling of ten years 
or more. Moreover, the decrease in the probability of survival at age 30, resulted from the 
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illness at age 16, is 2.8% for those with low initial education compared to 1% for those 
with higher levels of education. Finally, due to the health limitation at age 16, the mean 
present value of lifetime utility decreases 13% for the individuals with low initial 
education and 11% for those with high initial education, respectively. 
Table 2.11 indicates that initial education has a significant effect on the selected 
variables, and the magnitude of the initial education effect seems larger than the initial 
health status effect. But we cannot conclude consequently that the education effect is 
more important than the health effect in determining educational attainment and welfare 
before we find a unified measure to quantify their strengths.     
 
2.4.4 Policy application  
In this section, I evaluate the efficiency of policies aimed at decreasing inequality. 
The first policy experiment is a direct college tuition subsidy and the second policy 
experiment is to subsidize health expenditure during high school. The two experiments 
will incur the same amount of per capita cost. Therefore, by comparing the outcomes of 
the artificial experiments I am able to answer the question which policy is more efficient: 
spending on education or spending on health? 
       
2.4.4.1 College tuition subsidy 
Table 2.12 reports the distribution effect of a $2,100 college tuition subsidy, 
which is about 50% of college tuition. Although the subsidy is limited to college students, 
it will also affect the individuals’ decisions before entering college because they will 
anticipate it before making their decision to enter college. The people are divided into 
two groups: those having been sick at least once before age 21 (12.2% of the population 
before the subsidy) and those who have remained healthy before age 21 (87.8% of the 
population before the subsidy). Also, people are classified by their endowment types 
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based on the estimated parameters of population type ratio: high ability in both school 
and work (type 1), high ability in school and low ability in work (type 2), low ability in 
school and high ability in work (type 3), low ability in both school and work (type 4). For 
convenience, the baseline results without subsidy are listed.   
As expected, college tuition subsidy increases the levels of state variables 
including educational attainment, length of years spend in college, assets, and present 
value of lifetime utility. The average highest schooling years completed increases by 0.42 
years from 13.39 to 13.81 years. And the mean years in college increase by 0.35 years 
from 1.85 to 2.20 years. The mean value of assets at age 30 increase 18% from $19,134 
to $22,608. The mean expected present value of lifetime utility at age 16 increases 10.7% 
from 185.6 to 197.4. Finally, the percentage of those having faced significant sickness at 
age 20 decreases 0.9% from 12.2% to 11.3%.    
As seen, the college tuition subsidy has a smaller effect on a sick person than on a 
healthy person. In particular, educational attainment changes little for type 3’s and type 
4’s who have experienced at least one bout of sickness by the age 20. Specifically, the 
private gain of welfare from the subsidy is smaller for the sick person than for the healthy 
person. The mean present value of lifetime utility increases 5.6% for those experiencing 
sickness, compared to 11% for healthy people. 
In this case, the per capita cost of college tuition subsidy is $2,247, if shared by all 
of the individuals. However, the gains are very different across types and heath status, up 
to age 20. Overall, type 1’s and type 2’s experience greater gains from the program, who 
have a significant large college attendance regardless of the subsidy. In addition, healthy 




2.4.4.2 High school health expenditure subsidy  
Table 2.13 explores the effect of a $778 health expenditure subsidy for high 
school students, which can only be used as the health expenditure. With the $778 health 
expenditure subsidy, the per capita cost of program is $2,247, which is the same amount 
as the per capita college tuition subsidy.  
As shown, the average highest year of schooling completed increases by 0.53, 
which is 0.11 year more than with the college tuition subsidy. The mean years spent in 
college increases by 0.44, a little larger than with the college tuition subsidy. In addition, 
the mean assets at age 30 are almost the same as in the case of the college tuition subsidy. 
The overall welfare has a tiny increase with respective to the college tuition subsidy 
program. 
The gain distribution is much different in this case. Gains of sick and low 
endowment people improve substantially. This could be explained by the two reasons. 
First, health limitation decreases the possibility of passing a grade, and graduating from 
high school is the only path to attending college. Hence, a college tuition subsidy is not as 
attractive to those who anticipate a small probability of passing a grade. However, high 
school heath expenditure provides a direct channel for this population to gain from the 
subsidy. Second, for those people who would go to college even without the tuition 
subsidy, the benefits are most because of the level effect of the subsidy. But, for those 
who are induced to attend college, the benefits incurred from the marginal effect, i.e. 
marginal indifference between college attendance and other options.                    
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this study I structurally estimate a dynamic model of schooling, work, health 
expenditure and saving choices over the life cycle using 16 years of data from the 
NLSY79. The structural estimation framework fully imposes the restrictions of the 
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existing theoretical hypotheses on the correlation between health and education. The 
model’s estimates imply that an individual’s initial health status has a substantial 
influence on an individual’s educational attainment and expected survival probability. 
Indeed, health plays an extremely important role in determining an individual’s 
educational attainment. On average, having been sick before the age of 21 decreases the 
level of educational attainment by 1.4 years. Policy experiments based on the model’s 
estimates indicate that a health expenditure subsidy conditional on high school attendance 
would have a larger impact on the educational attainment than a direct college tuition 
subsidy. In particular, a direct college tuition subsidy will favor healthy individuals, 
especially those healthy and having low academic ability, while a subsidy of high school 







Figure 2.1: Stochastic Shocks and Decisions 
 
 




















Figure 2.4a: Predicted and Actual Mean Assets by Age: Whole Data 
 




Figure 2.5: Predicted and Actual Sick Percentage 
 




Table 2.1 Choice Distribution: White Males Aged 16-31 
           Sickness Data              Whole Data
Age School Work Home TOTAL School Work Home TOTAL
16 81.82 9.09 9.09 100 87.38 6.59 6.03 100
(36) (4) (4) (44) (928) (70) (64) (1062)
17 69.87 14.29 15.87 100 78.42 11.02 10.56 100
(44) (9) (10) (63) (832) (117) (112) (1061)
18 38.55 28.92 32.53 100 49.95 27.57 22.47 100
(32) (24) (27) (83) (529) (292) (238) (1059)
19 31.96 27.84 40.21 100 41.12 33.46 25.43 100
(31) (27) (39) (97) (435) (354) (269) (1058)
20 22.32 29.46 48.22 100 31.63 39.68 28.69 100
(25) (33) (54) (112) (334) (419) (303) (1056)
21 17.05 34.11 48.84 100 28.53 42.65 28.82 100
(22) (44) (63) (129) (301) (450) (304) (1055)
22 11.51 46.04 42.44 100 19.18 60.59 20.23 100
(16) (64) (59) (139) (202) (638) (213) (1053)
23 10.53 50.66 38.81 100 15.49 66.54 17.97 100
(16) (77) (59) (152) (163) (700) (189) (1052)
24 6.06 52.73 41.21 100 9.64 74.14 16.22 100
(10) (87) (68) (165) (101) (777) (170) (1048)
25 3.98 56.82 39.20 100 5.63 78.63 15.74 100
(7) (100) (69) (176) (59) (824) (165) (1048)
26 3.30 60.44 36.26 100 4.3 80.88 14.82 100
(6) (110) (66) (182) (45) (846) (155) (1046)
27 2.63 58.95 38.42 100 3.25 79.43 17.32 100
(5) (112) (73) (190) (34) (830) (181) (1045)
28 1.96 52.45 45.59 100 2.87 73.97 23.16 100
(4) (107) (93) (204) (30) (773) (242) (1045)
29 1.86 53.02 45.12 100 2.68 72.15 25.17 100
(4) (114) (97) (215) (28) (754) (263) (1045)
30 1.24 52.80 45.96 100 2.19 69.33 28.48 100
(2) (85) (74) (161) (17) (538) (221) (776)
31 1.16 51.16 47.68 100 1.94 68.47 29.59 100
(1) (44) (41) (86) (9) (317) (137) (463)
TOTAL 11.56 42.81 45.63 100 25.34 54.46 20.20 100
(254) (941) (1,003) (2,198) (4,047) (8,699) (3,226) (15,972)              
Note: Percentages and number of observations. 
Sickness data at age t consist of individuals who have been sick at least once up to and 




Table 2.2: Transition Matrix: Whole Data 
White Males Aged 16-31 
Choice (t )
Choice (t - 1) School Work Home
School:
Row % 73.49 12.98 13.52
Column % 92.59 9.25 17.61
Work:
Row % 2.31 86.98 10.7
Column % 3.71 78.97 17.77
Home:
Row % 4.26 23.92 71.82
Column % 3.7 11.78 64.62
* Observation No.: 14910  
 
Table 2.3: Transition Matrix: Sickness Data 
White Males Aged 16-31 
Choice (t )
Choice (t - 1) School Work Home
School:
Row % 58.7 15.38 25.97
Column % 83.09 6.25 10.66
Work
Row % 1.81 82.3 15.89
Column % 5.95 77.9 16.15
Home
Row % 3.49 19.25 77.26
Column % 11.22 16.72 72.05
* Observation No.: 2154  
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Table 2.4: Percentage Failing for Grades 9, 10, 11 and 12 
                                   White Males Aged 16-31
Grade 9 10 11 12
Whole data 13.9 6.08 5.54 3.63
(374) (954) (903) (799)
Sickness data 20.69 20.93 19.57 7.61
(35) (72) (71) (67)
* Number of observations with transcript report are in parentheses  
 
 
Table 2.5: Asset Distribution: Whole Data 
                                              White Male Aged 21 - 31
No. Percent
Age Median Mean Std Max Min Obs. Negative
21 1,931 4,209 6,404 55,330 -15,296 230 9.8
22 2,248 5,019 8,262 80,524 -14,753 497 11.2
23 2,752 5,883 10,581 115,630 -12,703 921 16.4
24 2,863 6,263 12,507 176,972 -31,618 911 16.7
25 3,590 8,082 16,071 196,907 -36,624 907 15.3
26 4,003 9,833 20,235 209,874 -43,152 938 16.6
27 5,237 12,803 22,458 227,072 -43,722 677 16.7
28 5,565 14,294 26,456 247,706 -33,388 607 15.0
29 7,443 15,424 27,621 262,705 -37,028 438 12.9
30 8,628 18,501 35,369 298,728 -21,211 589 11.6





Table 2.6: Asset Distribution: Sickness Date 
                                               White Male Aged 21 - 31
No. Percent
Age Median Mean Std Max Min Obs. Negative
21 1,333 3,389 6,306 16,927 -8,035 29 6.7
22 2,058 2,737 4,091 19,434 -7,402 67 20.9
23 2,566 5,064 8,042 36,585 -8,714 130 17.7
24 2,654 5,257 10,030 61,999 -13,719 141 17.0
25 3,000 6,289 9,488 52,133 -10,518 148 17.6
26 3,545 7,054 12,002 62,358 -11,312 160 20.0
27 4,886 10,452 17,390 93,206 -6,415 114 18.2
28 3,481 8,470 14,398 69,612 -12,197 103 18.5
29 3,703 9,898 15,695 84,883 -12,583 97 17.5
30 5,036 11,823 18,375 77,389 -9,347 118 16.1
31 6,169 13,203 23,483 96,098 -8,479 65 12.3
Note: 1984 dollars.















Table 2.7: Estimates of the Model 
 
Mortality Rate Function:  
constant 0α :  
sickness 1α :  





Pass/Fail the Grade: 
high study type 01ξ :                             
low study type 02ξ :                              
sickness 1ξ :                                   




-0.6245 (0.2533)  
-0.0047 (0.0226) 
Wage Function: 
high working type 01γ : 
low working type 02γ :  
educational attainment 1γ : 
experience 2γ : 
experience squared/100 3γ : 
age 4γ : 
sickness 5γ : 
interaction between sickness and duration 6γ : 











Home Production Function: 
   constant e : 
   sickness 1φ :  






   age 1β :  
   health expenditure 2β : 
   educational attainment 3β : 
   sickness 4β : 
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Estimates of the Model (Cont.) 
 
Terminal Value Function: 
   constant 01τ : 
   high study type 02τ : 
   high work type 03τ : 
   sickness 1τ : 
   interaction between sickness and duration 2τ : 
   educational attainment 3τ : 
   educational attainment squared /100 4τ : 
   asset 5τ : 
   asset squared / 1e5 6τ : 
   experience 7τ : 
   experience squared /100 8τ : 
   interaction between education and high study type 9τ : 
   interaction between education and high work type 10τ : 
   interaction between asset and high study type 11τ : 
   interaction between asset and high work type 12τ : 
   interaction between experience and high study type 13τ : 




















   standard deviation of wage wσ : 
   standard deviation of home production eσ : 





Preference Discount Factor δ :  0.9795 (0.2793) 
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion σ :  0.8043 (0.3691) 
Education Cost ec:  $4328(1569.2) 
Net Income Boundary NIB:  -$584.8 (178.25) 





Table 2.8: Estimated Sick Probabilities in Percentage by Age, Health expenditure and 
Health Status 
              Sick
Health 0-year 1-year 3-year 5-year
Age Expenditure Healthy duration duration duration duration
16 0 47.97 87.56 89.60 92.94 95.38
$250 24.40 69.52 73.13 79.64 85.1
$500 9.08 44.77 48.98 57.39 65.48
$750 2.4 21.95 25.21 32.42 40.36
$1,000 0.44 7.83 9.50 13.6 18.77
$1,750 0 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.25
25 0 51.02 89.06 90.92 93.91 96.08
$250 26.87 72.15 75.59 81.73 86.81
$500 10.40 47.80 52.03 60.37 68.26
$750 2.86 24.28 27.71 35.22 43.35
$1,000 0.55 9.02 10.86 15.34 20.9
$1,750 0 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.31
30 0 52.71 89.83 91.59 94.41 96.42
$250 28.29 73.56 76.91 82.84 87.69
$500 11.19 49.50 53.72 62 69.76
$750 3.15 25.62 29.15 36.81 45.03
$1,000 0.62 9.73 11.68 16.37 22.15
$1,750 0 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.35
* Eucation attainement is 10 grades 






Table 2.9: Estimated Education Effect on Sick Probability 
              Sick
Health 0-year 3-year
Grade Expenditure Healthy duration duration
8 0 50.81 88.96 93.85
$500 10.31 47.60 60.17
$1,000 0.54 8.93 15.22
12 0 47.83 87.49 92.89
$500 9.03 44.63 57.26
$1,000 0.43 7.78 13.53
16 0 44.86 85.88 91.82
$500 7.87 41.69 54.31
$1,000 0.35 6.75 11.97
* Age is 20.














Table 2.10: Predicted and Actual State Variables 
     Sickness Data        Whole Data
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Years of schooling:
    Mean highest schooling years completed 12.63 12.58 13.39 13.40
    Percent 12 schooling years completed 83.29 75.68 87.08 83.71
    Percent 16 schooling years completed 13.52 13.06 17.71 25.80
Mean percentage of employment 41.86 42.81 48.81 54.46
Mean percentage of school attendance 20.54 11.56 28.65 25.34
Mean percentage of home 37.60 45.63 22.54 20.20
Percent grade fail *:
    Grade 9 17.32 20.69 5.61 13.90
    Grade 10 17.66 20.93 5.85 6.08
    Grade 11 16.44 19.57 5.22 5.54
    Grade 12 16.17 7.61 4.97 3.63
Mean assets at age **:
21 2805 3389 3548 4209
24 4767 5257 5796 6263
27 9722 10452 12466 12803
30 13404 11823 19134 18501
Mean health expenditure*** 896.6 -- 850.5 --
Note: Based on 8,000 simulated individuals.
The sickness data include all the individuals who have been sick during the 16-year periods.
          * In this case, the sickness data consists of cumulative individuals who reported sickness 
  by the specified grade.
** The age-t sickness data consists of cumulative individuals who have been sick up to age t.










Table 2.11: Initial Health Status Effects by Initial Schooling 
 
Healthy at Age 16 Sick at Age 16
        Initial Schooling Nine Years or Less
Mean education attainment at age 30 13.17 12.82
Mean percent survival probability at age 30 97.36 94.60
Mean asset at age 30 17,676 14,822
Mean health expenditure by age 30 834 892
Expected present value of lifetime utility at age 16 186.4 162.5
       Initial Schooling Ten Years or More
Mean education attainment at age 30 14.60 14.33
Percent survival probability at age 30 98.12 97.08
Asset at age 30 28,654 24,586
Mean health expenditure by age 30 1030 1072
Expected present value of lifetime utility at age 16 224.6 204.1












Table 2.12: Effect of a $2100 College Tuition Subsidy on Selected State Variables* 
        Sick up to and including Age 20**         Healthy up to and including Age 20
Characteristics All All Types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 All Types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Average highest schooling
 years completed:
    No subsidy 13.39 12.17 12.35 12.72 10.12 10.24 13.56 13.64 14.03 12.0 12.26
    Subsidy 13.81 12.55 12.76 13.16 10.16 10.32 13.97 13.92 14.45 12.81 13.15
Mean years in college:
    No subsidy 1.85 0.73 0.65 1.12 0.05 0.07 2.01 2.19 2.34 0.43 0.61
    Subsidy 2.20 1.1 1.15 1.44 0.05 0.07 2.34 2.26 2.82 1.32 1.58
Asset at age 30
    No subsidy 19,134 11,725 12,464 13,237 5,474 4,794 20,163 21,047 21,369 14,099 13,597
    Subsidy 22,608 13,077 14,026 14,814 5,483 4,830 23,822 24,398 25,873 16,822 16,056
Mean expected present value
 of lifetime utility at age 16:
    No subsidy 185.6 156.5 162.5 154.8 142.9 133.9 189.6 208.6 198.4 182.0 174.2
    Subsidy 197.4 165.2 171.6 166.2 143.0 134.1 222.9 231.3 223.5 196.1 185.0
Note: * The per capita cost of the subsidy is $2,247.
         ** The percent sickness up to and including age 20 without subsidy is 12.2%, while the percent sickness with subsidy is 11.3%.
         1. Based on a simulation of 8,000 individuals.
         2. Type 1: high ability in school and work; Type 2: high ability in school and low ability in work   
             Type 3: low ability in school and high ability in work; Type 4: low ability in school and low ability in work
         3. The skill endowments are drawn according to the population ratio of types.







Table 2.13: Effect of a $778 Health Expenditure Subsidy for High School Students on Selected State Variables* 
         Sick up to and including Age 20**          Healthy up to and including Age 20
Characteristics All All Types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 All Types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Average highest schooling
 years completed:
    No subsidy 13.39 12.17 12.35 12.72 10.12 10.24 13.56 13.64 14.03 12.0 12.26
    Subsidy 13.92 13.20 13.25 13.64 11.76 12.03 13.99 13.89 14.43 13.18 13.31
Mean years in college
    No subsidy 1.85 0.73 0.65 1.12 0.05 0.07 2.01 2.19 2.34 0.43 0.61
    Subsidy 2.29 1.68 1.72 2.13 0.34 0.50 2.35 2.22 2.79 1.61 1.86
Asset at age 30
    No subsidy 19,134 11,725 12,464 13,237 5,474 4,794 20,163 21,047 21,369 14,099 13,597
    Subsidy 22,603 16,770 16,312 19,831 8,519 13,564 23,230 23,644 24,621 18,316 17,983
Mean expected present value
 of lifetime utility at age 16:
    No subsidy 195.4 156.5 162.5 154.8 142.9 133.9 200.8 208.6 198.4 182.0 174.2
    Subsidy 218.5 186.6 192.4 187.8 159.7 164.9 221.7 228.0 220.4 204.7 198.6
Note: * The per capita cost of the subsidy is $2247, same amount as the per capita college tuition subsidy.
         ** The percent sickness up to and including age 20 without subsidy is 12.2%, while the percent sickness with subsidy is 9.7%.
         1. Based on a simulation of 8,000 individuals.
         2. Type 1: high ability in school and work; Type 2: high ability in school and low ability in work   
             Type 3: low ability in school and high ability in work; Type 4: low ability in school and low ability in work
         3. The skill endowments are drawn according to the population ratio of types.










Chapter 3: Subjective Mortality Risk and Bequest Motivation 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is known in the literature that a significant portion of household wealth is 
passed from one generation to another by bequest. According Kotlikoff and Summers 
(1981), 80% household-held capital was inherited. Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate that 
total bequests were $105 billion in the U.S. in 1986. Hurd and Smith (2002) find that the 
elderly anticipate leaving roughly 40% of their wealth in bequests. Kotlikoff (1988) 
claims that inherited wealth plays an important and perhaps dominant role in U.S. wealth 
accumulation. Thus it is conceivable that bequests may hold a key answer to the social 
security problem that baby boomers may face: they may eventually receive significant 
estates from their parents such that their dependence on social security may be reduced. 
However, predicting whether a large portion of wealth will be passed from one 
generation to the next generation requires knowledge of the motives for bequests.1 As 
pointed out in the literature (Kotlikoff 1988; Hurd 1989), a large amount of bequeathed 
wealth does not necessarily imply a substantial motive for bequests. Without a well-
functioning annuity market, people will have to save against mortality risk, and the 
resulting bequests are involuntary. If most bequests are in fact involuntary or accidental, 
the value of the bequeathed wealth may decrease in the future as the annuity market 
 
1 Various incentives for bequest are offered in the literature. Some argue that bequests serve as incentives 
to younger generations to provide appropriate care for older generations (Cox 1987; Bernheim, Shleifer and 
Summers, 1985).  Others argue that bequests are mainly motivated by altruism. 
further develops.2 In addition, it is also possible that people may change their perceptions 
of stock market risks after the recent crash of the market. In that case, more people may 
move into annuities, and the total amount of bequeathed wealth will decrease.3  
There is no consensus in the literature on the significance of bequest motives. 
Some people (Bernheim 1987; Kotlikoff and Summers, 1988) argue that the bequest 
motive is important while others (Hurd 1989) claim that it is almost zero, and most 
bequests are accidental or involuntary.  
It is well known that subjective expectations about future events are important 
factors to understand individual economic behaviors, such as saving, consumption and 
investment. However, few available information or data on individual subjective 
expectations limits the application of economic models to explain individual actions. Our 
main goal in this study is to investigate the empirical relevance of subjective survival 
rates for bequest motives. More specifically, we want to exam if and to what extent 
subjectively expected mortality risks are correlated with bequest motives in the presence 
of a borrowing constraint for single elders. We estimate a life cycle model with uncertain 
lifetime as developed by Yaari (1965) and Hurd (1989). Instead of applying the 
commonly used life tables to approximate individual survival expectations, we adopt the 
estimated individual subjective survival curves from Gan, Hurd and McFadden (2003, 
henceforth GHM).  
Empirical estimates that are based on life-table survival curves are likely to be 













                                                 
2 Poterba (1997) documents that variable annuity premium payments increased by a factor of five during 
the period 1988-1993.  
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3 The S&P 500 index peaked on August 2001 at 1517.7. Since then, it has dropped to 879.8 at the end of 
2002. 
where ct is the consumption at time t, and γ is the risk aversion parameter. The first order 
condition in a common formulation (without a bequest motive) is: 
)(/)lnln(ln ttt Xfsrc +∆++≈∆ γβ , 
where Xt represents some socio-demographic and/or economic variables, r is the interest 
rate, and β is the time discount factor. st is the subjective survival probability at time t so 
that -∆lnst is the mortality hazard rate. If st is not measured but it is correlated with Xt, we 
have a classic problem of endogeneity. If st is measured with error, the parameter 
estimate of γ will be biased. 
A large panel dataset, the Asset and Health Dynamics among Oldest Old 
(AHEAD) collects data on people who were born between 1890 and 1923 and their 
spouses (regardless of age) including information on individuals’ expectations of a wide 
range of future events. Respondents in the survey are asked about their expectations of 
chances to live to a certain age. Earlier work, such as Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) 
and GHM have looked at the subjective probabilities regarding survival rates. These 
papers have found that, on average, individual subjective survival probabilities are 
consistent with life tables and that they vary appropriately with known risk factors.  
Therefore, there is important information content in these responses on subjective 
survival probabilities.  
However, the subjective survival probabilities suffer serious focal response 
problems: some individuals tend to give responses of 0.0 and 1.0. These focal responses 
cannot be directly used in analyzing life-cycle models where survival probabilities are 
required. To eliminate focal biases, GHM suggest a Bayesian update method. For each 
individual in the AHEAD data set, GHM estimate an “optimism” index. Compared to the 
life table survival probability, an individual may overestimate or underestimate his/her 
survival probability. The estimated “optimism” indices show significant individual 
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heterogeneity, and can be applied to derive individuals’ subjective survival probabilities 
without focal biases. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a life-
cycle model with bequests. Our emphasis is on how to estimate such a model. Section 3 
presents the estimation results. In particular, Section 3.1 introduces the data that will be 
used in the study. Three key variables are used in the empirical variables: wealth, income 
and subjective survival probabilities. In Section 3.2, we present parameter estimates 
based on various estimation methods. Section 3.3 calculates the bequest incentives based 
on estimates from Section 3.2. In Section 3.4, we conduct out-of-sample predictions and 
simulate the consumption and wealth trajectories under various sets of parameter 
estimates. Finally, we summarize the results of this study and discuss several issues for 
future research in Section 4. 
 
3.2 THE MODEL 
Our starting point is the standard life-cycle model with bequest as in Yaari (1965) 
and Hurd (1989). Let the utility function of a retired individual be: 













where  is the subjective probability that the individual will be alive at time t.  is 
the subjective mortality rate at time t + 1: 
ts 1+tm
11 ++ −= ttt ssm . The subjective maximal 
number of periods an individual can survive is N. The time discount factor is denoted as 
β. Consumption at time t is denoted as ct, and the wealth at the beginning of time t is 
denoted as wt. The first term in (3.1) is the present value of utility from consumption 
conditional on survival; and the second term in (3.1) is the present value of the utility 
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from leaving a bequest of wt+1 conditional dying at t + 1. The utility from bequest, 
B(wt+1), is increasing in wt+1. 
This model only applies to singles. The corresponding model for couples is much 
more complicated because it has to account for bequeathing by a couple to the next 
generation, and also for providing to a surviving spouse.4  
As in Hurd (1989), we further assume a borrowing constraint such that 
bequeathable wealth cannot become negative. The constraint imposed on borrowing 
indicates that future Social Security benefits cannot be used as collateral for a 
consumption loan. This constraint arises from the fact that all heads of households in the 
sample are older than 70 years old in 1993 when the survey started, and in the U.S., 
Social Security benefits cannot be used as collateral. Such a constraint imposes important 
boundary condition in our analysis. Equation (2) lists the budget constraint at time t: 
1 1 1(1 ) 0t t t tw r w A c− − −= + + − ≥ ,                    (3.2) 
where  is annuity income at time t-1. 1−tA
It is typical in this literature to assume a constant risk aversion utility function 
. The income from annuities such as Social Security is assumed to be 
constant. The marginal utility of a bequest, denoted as α, is dependent on how many 
children the person has:  
( ) ( )γγ −= − 1/1tt ccU





                                                
,         (3.3) 
where 1children is an indicator function. The assumption that the bequest motive exists only 
if the person has any children is important to identify the model. Otherwise, the 
identification may only come from the functional form assumptions.  
 
4 Estimating the couple’s bequest motive is our next research objective.  
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The maximal age that a person may live, denoted as N, is obtained when the 
person’s subjective survival rate st < 1e-4. Different agents have different maximum ages 
N since their subjective survival rates are different. Given the interest rate r, income A, 
and the parameter values of β, γ, and α, the paths of wealth are always contingent on the 
initial wealth w0. However, the paths of consumption may not dependent on the initial 
wealth w0. The solution to the optimization problem depends on whether the borrowing 
constraint is binding or not. The analysis of the solution of the discrete model is similar to 
that of the continuous model in Hurd (1989). Here we only state how to estimate the 
model.  
Estimating the model requires at least two waves of wealth data for each 
individual. We use wealth data in wave 2 and wave 3 to estimate the model. The wave 4 
wealth data is used for out-of-sample prediction.5 The wealth level in wave 2 serves as 
the initial wealth w0. We use backward induction to find the trajectories of the wealth and 
consumption. For a given set of parameter values β, γ, and α, we can obtain the 
trajectories of wealth , where the superscript b indicates the value is 
calculated from backward induction. We then compare  at the trajectory with the 
observed wave 3 wealth . We use the subscript 3 because in our data set the interval 
between the two waves of wealth is 3 years. The parameter set that minimizes the 
difference between  and w3 are our estimates.  





There are three types of consumptions paths corresponding to low, medium, and 
high wealth. We discuss these three different cases in the discrete model: 
(1) In the first case, the bequest is strictly positive even if the individual survives 
to the greatest age possible:  i.e., . Then the consumption trajectory satisfies: 01 >+Nw
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5 There is strong evidence that wave 1 wealth data in AHEAD underestimate the stock ownership and 










γ              (3.3a) 
The trajectory in (3.3a) and actually initial wealth, w0, satisfy  












t cArwrw                          (3.3b) 
Equation (3.3a) shows that consumption trajectory is dependent of subjective 
survival rate but is independent of initial wealth  if the wealth level at N +1 is strictly 
positive. This occurs because the marginal utility from consumption (left-hand-side) at 
time t has to equal to the present value of the marginal utility from bequest, which is 
assumed to be independent of wealth level. The wealth trajectory, , can be calculated 
from the equation (3.3b), which shows that wealth trajectories vary according to the 
initial wealth w0. Figure 1-1 shows the typical consumption and wealth trajectories. As 
illustrated, while wealth monotonically increases and consumption monotonically 
decreases, they may exhibit other patterns. The only requirement for this case is the 




The minimal level of initial wealth that corresponds to the consumption path 
(3.3a) is , given by: *0w









i Acrw . 
Any initial wealth larger than  will produce a consumption path as 
in (3.3a), and will lead to . Note that both N and  vary as individual subjective 
survival rate varies.  
*





(2) In the second case, although the bequest is zero at the time of death, (wN+1= 
0), the borrowing constraint is not binding; that is, the wealth level is strictly positive for 
any t<N+1. The consumption path satisfies: 
( ) 1111 ++−+− ++= ttttt mscrsc αβ γγ , for  1,1,0 −= Nt K      (3.4a) 
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N cArwrw             (3.4b)  
0>tw , for          (3.4c) .,2,1 Nt K=
Equation (3.4b) states that the consumption trajectory should lead to zero wealth 
level at time N +1: the person will leave no bequest should he or she live to the greatest 
age possible. Figure 3.1-3.2 illustrates one case where wealth reaches zero exactly at the 
maximum possible age. Consumption in Figure 3.1-3.2 first increases and then decreases 
as mortality risk becomes large. However, it is possible that consumption monotonically 
decreases if the time discount factor is small.  
There will be a range of initial wealth and associated consumption paths that 
satisfy (3.4a), (3.4b) and (3.4c). The intuition for this result will be discussed when we 
provide estimation algorithm (Step 2 in the algorithm. See Appendix B). Let  be the 
largest of these values so that any value of  larger than  leads to  and 
the consumption path will be independent of . Let  be the smallest of those values 
so that any smaller value of initial wealth causes the wealth to reach 0 before N +1. Let 
and  be the individual’s consumption and wealth trajectories associated with , 
and  and  be the individual’s consumption and wealth trajectories associated 
with . Therefore, in the case of medium wealth, the consumption trajectory must lie 








*{ }c }{ *w
*
0w
}ˆ{c }{ *c }ˆ{w }{ *w
(3) Lastly, we consider the case that the borrowing constraint is binding. Let T be 
the time when bequeathable wealth is exhausted. The consumption path is found from the 
solutions to four equations, (3.5a)-(3.5d):   
Act = for NTt ,,L= ,                                         (3.5a) 
( ) 1111 ++−+− ++= ttttt mscrsc αβ γγ , for 2,1,0 −= Tt K ,                  (3.5b) 












T cArwrw .                (3.5c) 
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0>tw , for         (3.5d) .1,2,1 −= Tt K
In this case consumption and wealth will eventually decline. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
consumption and wealth trajectories in this case. 
Each individual in our sample has a different subjective survival curve. Therefore, 
every individual’s critical value of wealth is different. We search to find out his/her 
critical wealth value, and then calculate his/her consumption and wealth trajectories. Our 
objective is to find a set parameter values that minimize the difference between the 
predicted second wave wealth, , and the observed second wave wealth, w3. We 
consider two different objective functions: mean square loss function and the absolute 














ii ww 33,,minγβα                    (3.6b) 
The mean square loss function in (3.6a) is the one used in Hurd (1989). The 
absolute value loss function in (3.6b) corresponds to median regression. The advantage 
for median regression over the mean regression is that median regression is robust to 
outliers.  
We briefly discuss how to estimate the covariance matrix. Let the parameter set 
be denoted as δ = (γ, β, α)’, and let the covariance matrix be Ω. It is straightforward to 
obtain the covariance matrix for estimates based (3.6a). The covariance matrix from 












































,      (3.7) 
where is the density of the error term  evaluated at 0. The error term  is 





regression, and then evaluate the obtained density function at 0 to get . The 
expectation part can be calculated by sample average. Since no explicit solutions exist for 





3.3 DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
3.3.1 Data 
Our data set consists of the second, third and fourth waves of the AHEAD sample. 
We do not employ wave 1 data because there is good evidence that the first wave of 
AHEAD underreported asset holdings. To select our sample, we use the following sample 
selection criteria: (1) Because the model in this study applies only to singles, our sample 
only includes people who are alive and who are singles in both wave 2 and wave 3. (2) 
Total wealth or non-housing wealth is non-negative in wave 2 and wave 3.  (3) 
Responses to the survival probability question in wave 2 are valid. When total wealth is 
used as one of the selection criterion, the number of valid observations is 1,903. When we 
consider non-housing wealth, the number of observations decreases to 1,752. Among 
these valid observations in wave 1 and wave 2, only 1,460 of them are still valid in wave 
3. 
Three key variables are used in this study: household wealth, income, and 
individual subjective survival curves. We now discuss these three variables in detail. 
(1) The Wealth and Income Data  
The AHEAD survey is a panel survey of older Americans. The wave 1 survey of 
AHEAD was conducted in 1993. The initial sample of AHEAD includes a sample of 
people who were 70 years old or more in 1993 (and their spouses regardless of ages). The 





and 2000, respectively. The AHEAD data set provides more than 10 categories of wealth 
data. It is well-known in the literature that often a large portion of people do not provide 
valid responses on wealth questions (Juster and Smith, 1997; Chand and Gan, 2003). 
AHEAD uses a sequence of questions to bracket a wealth item. Although this technique 
is very successful in reducing non-response rates, it requires serious effort to impute the 
wealth values. Chand and Gan (2002) discuss various imputation methods. The imputed 
wealth data used in this study are obtained from Adams et al (2003) who impute three 
waves of wealth and two waves of income. In Table 3.1, we list summary statistics of the 
total wealth and the wealth net of housing wealth. For each wave of wealth, we list the 
mean, median, variance, minimum and maximum values. From Table 3.1, mean wealth 
decreases slightly between wave 2 and wave 3 but decreases significantly between wave 
3 and wave 4. Specifically, between wave 2 and wave 3, the mean total wealth decreases 
4.5% while the non-housing wealth decreases by 2.5%. Between wave 3 and wave 4, the 
mean total wealth declines 18% and the non-housing wealth declines 30%. The pattern 
for the median wealth is different from the mean wealth. Between wave 2 and wave 3, the 
median wealth decrease 14% and 15% for total wealth and non-housing wealth. 
However, between wave 3 and wave 4, there is a slightly increase for the median total 
wealth with rate 5.8%. The decreasing rate for non-housing wealth between wave 3 and 4 
is 6.2%.  
As Table 3.1 indicates, the median wealth is less than half of the mean wealth, 
reflecting the positive skewness that exists in the asset distribution. More specifically, the 
median is respectively 35%, 32% and 48% of the mean for the wave 2, 3 and 4 total 
wealth, and respectively 20%, 14%, and 19% of the mean for the wave 2, 3, and 4 non-
housing wealth.  
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In Table 3.2, we list age, the number of children and income. The average age of 
respondents in the second wave is 79 years of old. Although heads of households in our 
sample have to be at least 72 years in wave 2, their spouses who may be younger are also 
included in the sample. The number of people in our sample who are younger than 72 
years old is 46 (2.63% of the sample). Among all the people in our sample, 80.2% have 
children. The average number of children in our sample is 2.55. One household has 16 
children. Second wave income is used as a measure of people’s annuity income. The 
mean income level is $18,107 with a large standard deviation of $22,873.  
(2) Individual Subjective Survival Probability 
In this study, for each individual, we construct two survival curves: the life-table 
survival curve and the subjective survival curve. The life-table survival curve is directly 
obtained from the life table. The subjective survival curve is obtained from GHM. Here 
we briefly describe the subjective survival curve. One innovation in two recent surveys 
(Health and Retirement Study and AHEAD) is that they include questions about 
respondent’s subjective probabilities about events in the future. In particular, each 
respondent is asked about his/her perceived probability of surviving to a target age that is 
between 10 and 15 years in the future. Although Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) show 
that on average these subjective probabilities are generally consistent with life tables, at 
the individual level, they suffer a serious problem. In all age groups, a substantial fraction 
of respondents give responses of 0.0 and 1.0. These responses cannot represent the 
respondents’ true probabilities. GHM develop a model to recover each individual’s “true” 
subjective probability.   
Given the same age and sex, different people may have very different subjective 
survival probabilities. Some of the difference may relate to the health and wealth 
situations of individuals, some may simply be reflect personality. For each individual in 
their data set (AHEAD), GHM estimate an “optimism” index. Compared to the life table 
survival probability, an individual may overestimate or underestimate his/her survival 
probability. The estimated “optimism” index in GHM shows that significant individual 
heterogeneity exist in the AHEAD population. In a simple life cycle model, GHM show 
that ignoring individual heterogeneities may result in bias estimates. In this study, we 
apply both the subjective survival probability developed in GHM and the life table 
survival probability.  
Four different “optimism” indices were estimated in GHM, representing four 
different specifications. In this study, we use the “unconstrained hazard-scaling” index.6 
In particular, let the current age of individual i be a. His subjective survival probability to 







iaia drrats 0 )(exp)( λ , 
where λia(a+t) is the hazard function at age a+t. Further, let the individual’s life table 
hazard be λi0(a+t). The “unconstrained hazard-scaling” in GHM assumes that: 
λia(a+t)=ψiλi0(a+t) where ψi is the individual’s optimism index. If ψi>1, this individual is 
said to be “pessimistic”; if ψi<1, then this person is “optimistic”. Table 3.2 has the 
summary statistics of this index estimated fro responses in wave 2.  
The mean and median of ψi are .659 and .663, respectively. People in this sample 
are on average more optimistic about their survival probabilities than the life table 
implies. A more optimistic person may save more than a life-table person would do. If we 
use an observed sequence of wealth to estimate our model, the estimates based on 
subjective survival curves should indicate a lower time discount factor and/or lower 
bequest motive than the estimates based on life tables. 
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3.3.2 Estimation Results 
Our main results exclude housing wealth. In principle, at the extreme of very high 
transaction costs, it is difficult to change the consumption level of housing. Therefore, 
holding of housing wealth would simply reflect initial conditions and differences between 
the rate of housing appreciation and the general inflation rate. Excluding housing wealth 
from bequeathable wealth would give a better idea of the change in desired wealth 
holdings than would be found from including housing wealth.7  
In Table 3.3, we report the estimates of our model by using non-housing wealth 
and by assuming a fixed interest rate r = 0.04. We will test the robustness of our 
estimates later by using different interest rates. In Panel (A) of Table 3.3, we apply 
median regression to estimate the model using both subjective and life-table survival 
curves. Although the marginal utility of bequests is estimated to be almost zero in both 
cases, other parameter estimates vary significantly. Using life-table survival curve yields 
a higher time discount rate than using subjective survival curves. This is expected 
because people subjectively overestimate their survival probabilities. They behave 
accordingly by saving more to prepare for a longer lifespan, rather than valuing future 
consumption more than current-period consumption as implied by the estimates based 
life-table survival curves. 
Panel (B) in Table 3.3 lists the estimates when the mean regression method is 
used. The marginal utilities of bequest in this panel are much larger than those estimated 
in Panel (A), which imply strong bequest motives. Another observation in Panel (B) is 
 
7 For completeness, however, we also estimated the model over total wealth, which includes housing asset. 
The results over total wealth actually are very close to those over non-housing wealth. For example, the 
estimates over total wealth and subjective survival rates for parameters risk-averse coefficient γ, time 




that the time discount factor is estimated to be significantly larger than 1, indicating that 
people value future consumption more than current consumption. Between the two sets of 
the estimates from mean regressions, the time discount factor is higher when the life table 
survival curve is used. 
It is important to note that in a life-cycle model of time-varying survival 
probabilities, a time discount factor that is larger than 1 does not imply necessarily non-
stationary growth in either consumption or wealth. Kocherlakota (1990) shows that it is 
possible that people still prefers current consumption to future one even with β>1, as 
long as the output or income grows at a rate that is sufficiently high. Kocherlakota’s 
discussion is based on an infinitely lived representative agent. In our model, individual 
agent has constant income levels. From equation (3.1), even with β>1, the rate of 
consumption growth will turn negative at the time when the hazard rate -∆lnst is large 
enough. 
The reason to have such an unusual time discount factor is that non-housing 
wealth during the sample period declined by only 2.5%. Apparently because of no 
significant difference in bequest motives between those who have children and those who 
do not have children, the marginal utility of bequest is almost always zero. Given the 
constant interest rate at .04, matching such a small decrease in wealth requires the 
individual to have tremendous incentives to save. This large saving incentive has to come 
from a large time discount factor. One major drawback, we suspect, is the interest rate we 
use: the return to capital investment may not be at 4% during our sample period. 
However, how to formally incorporate varying interest rate requires a model of portfolio 
choice. The dataset does not have enough information to estimate such a model.  
In summary, mean regression yields very different parameter estimates from 
median regression. More specifically, mean regression suggests very large desired 
bequests while the median regression implies almost zero bequest motives. In addition, 
life table mortality risk yields a slightly larger bequest motives than subjective mortality 
risk.   
In Table 3.4, we list results from median regressions with varying interest rates. 
The risk-averse parameters and the time discount factor are very close to the reference 
value when interest rate changes from .02 to .06. Within this range of interest rates the 
marginal utility of bequests is very small. 
In the following section, we will try to understand the economic significance of 
the bequest motives by some simulation exercises. 
  
3.3.3 Bequest Simulations 
Among the three parameters we estimate, it is relatively easy to understand the 
economic significance of the risk-averse parameter γ and the time discount factor β. To 
understand the effect of γ and β on bequests, consider a familiar consumption growth 
equation in the absence of the bequest motive of equation: 
γβ /)lnln(ln tt src ∆++≈∆ . Given the survival rate and the risk-averse parameter γ, 
a larger β will increase algebraically the slope of the consumption path and because of the 
lifetime budget constraint, initial consumption will have to be reduced. Thus more wealth 
will be held and so bequests will increase. Although the effect of time discount factor β 
on bequests is clear, the effect of the risk-averse parameter on bequests is ambiguous. 
When the consumption path is decreasing a larger γ will increase algebraically the slope 
of the consumption path causing more wealth to be held and increasing bequests. When 
the consumption path is increasing a larger γ will flatten the consumption path causing 




effect on bequests or wealth holdings for γ is ambiguous. It is important to note that a 
change in bequests because of a change in either γ or β is a change in accidental bequest.  
A non-accidental bequest is measured by the marginal utility of bequest, α. The 






Two methods measure the economic significance of marginal utility of bequest, α: 
[ tttt mwwr∑ −+ − )0(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ)1( α        (3.8a) 
[ ttt sww∑ − )0(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ α         (3.8b) 
where ( childrenofNoˆˆ1ˆ 10children ⋅+≡ ααα . In (3.8a) and (3.8b), )ˆ(ˆ αtw is the optimal 
wealth trajectory given initial wealth and the estimated values of parameters. The term 
 is defined in the similar way except that the marginal utility of bequests is zero. 
Equation (3.8a) and (3.8b) represent two different ways to understand the effect of 
bequests. In (3.8a), we calculate the present value of bequests. In (3.8b), we calculate the 
population difference in wealth holdings with and without a bequest motive. In another 
words, (3.8b) represents the effect of a bequest motive on the population wealth holdings. 
In Table 3.5, we calculate the effect of a bequest motive for a particular individual: a 
male at age 79 whose initial wealth is $35,000 and whose income is $12,000. The 
individual has two children. The optimistic index of this individual is 0.6594, and thereby 
the life expectancy is 109 years old.   
)0(ˆ tw
The results in Table 3.5 are presented in three different panels, grouped by their 
estimation methods. In the first three rows, (R1)-(R4), we let the marginal utility of 
bequests vary. In particular, row (R1) corresponds to a bequest motive estimated from 
(A1) in Table 3.3 where subjective mortality risk is used. We let time discount factor vary 
in rows (R5)-(R7), and let the risk averse parameter vary in rows (R8)-(R10). The 
marginal utility of bequest parameter has significant impact on the level of desired 
bequest and on the difference in wealth holdings. In rows (R1)-(R4) where the risk averse 
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parameter (γ) and the time discount factor (β) are estimated using the median regression, 
the desired bequest rises from almost zero to $125,278 and the difference in wealth 
holding increases from $1 to $1,082,618 when the marginal utility of bequests increases 
from 2.47E-06 to 1. The effect of varying the marginal utility of bequests on desired 
bequests and on the difference in wealth holdings is very large. As the marginal utility of 
bequests is 1, the consumption path is rather flatten decreasing from $1,211 at age 79 to 
$1,013 age 109, which implies that the agent’s 90% - 95% annuity of $12,000 are turned 
into bequests or wealth holdings. In contrast, as the marginal utility of bequests is the 
value from median regression with subjective mortality risk, the consumption path is 
rather deep dramatically dropping from $21,766 at age 79 to annuity level $12,000 at age 
86.          
In rows (R5)-(R7), we allow the time discount factor vary while keeping risk 
averse parameter constant. The marginal utility of bequest is constant at 0.001. In this 
case, desired bequests increases from $2.58 to $1,408 when the time discount factor 
increases from 0.7 to 1.3. The result that a larger time discount factor is related to a 
higher desired bequest is consistent to the prior discussion. Finally, in rows (R8)-(R10), 
we consider the effect of risk averse parameter γ. A larger γ implies a more risk averse 
agent. When γ increases from 0.5 to 2.0, the desired bequest increases from $5.80 to 
$518.5.  
In summary, simulation results show that a higher marginal bequest motive, larger 
time discount factor, and larger risk averse parameter all increase the level of desired 
bequests significantly. A modest increase in either of the three variables may lead to a 




3.3.4 Consumption/Wealth Trajectory and Out-of-Sample Predictions 
A typical way to evaluate parameter estimates from different methods is to 
conduct out-of-sample predictions. We used wealth data in wave 2 and wave 3 to obtain 
parameter estimates. We will now use the estimated parameters to predict the wealth 
values in wave 4, and compare the predicted wealth to observed wealth in wave 4. Table 
3.6 has the comparison results. Each column in Table 3.6 reports various sums of errors 
based on a given set of parameter estimates. The column number, A1, A2, B1, or B2, 
corresponds to the estimates listed in Panel A and Panel B in Table 3.3. These estimates 
differ in their estimation method and their survival probabilities. The out-of-sample 
calculation is based on the same survival probability as the parameter estimates are. For 
example, if the set of parameters is obtained based on subjective survival probability, the 
out-of-sample calculation is also based on the subjective survival probability.  
Parameter estimates in Column (A1) and (A2) are from median regressions while 
Column (B1) and (B2) are from mean regressions. Not surprisingly, (A1) and (A2) have 
smaller absolute errors and smaller mean square errors than (B1) and (B2), regardless of 
error types. Furthermore, (A1) and (A2) have a lower sum of absolute errors for low 
wealth people and a larger sum of absolute errors for high wealth people than (B1) and 
(B2). This is expected because mean square regressions tend to fit high-wealth 
observations better because the large wealth values are magnified by the square 
operation.  
Results in Table 3.6 can also be used to evaluate the advantage of using subjective 
survival probability instead of life-table survival probability. When the median 
regressions are used, parameter estimates based on subjective survival probability (A1) 
produce lower sums of mean square errors and lower sum of absolute errors in out-of-
sample prediction of wealth than estimates based on life-table survival curves. In 
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particular, the mean square errors and the absolute errors from subjective survival curves 
are 42% and 5% less than the corresponding errors from life-table survival curves. 
The second and the third panel in Table 3.6 report comparison results based on 
predicted mean and predicted median. Although predicted means using both survival 
curves are lower than the observed mean at wave 4, the mean ($87,033) from subjective 
survival curves is much closer to the observed mean ($118,112) than the mean ($71,413) 
from life-table survival curves. Further, we divide the sample into four quartiles 
according to the wealth level at wave 3, and compare the predicted and observed means 
in each quartile. In the fourth panel in Table 3.6, using subjective survival curves 
produces better predictions than using life-table survival curves in all four quartiles. At 
the first quartile, the predicted mean using subjective survival curves is $8.6 while the 
predicted mean using life table is $2,385. The observed means at wave 4 is $-1,548. At 
the second quartile, the predicted mean from subjective survival curves is $7,947, which 
is much closer to the observed mean ($9,091) than the predicted mean from life table 
($2,385). Similar patterns are observed for the third and fourth quartiles. 
When the mean regression method is used, parameter estimates based on 
subjective survival curves do not have a significant advantage in predicting fourth wave 
wealth comparing to ones based on life-table survival curves. Based on these results, we 
conclude that median regression is better than mean regression, and subjective survival 
probability better describes individual saving and bequest decisions than the life-table 
survival probability. 
Finally, to better understand how people’s consumption and wealth vary, we 
apply estimates from Table 3.3 to simulate a hypothetical person’s consumption and 
wealth trajectories in Figure 3.2. The hypothetical person we consider is: single male at 
age 79 with an optimistic index of .6594. He has two children. His initial wealth and 
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income are assumed at the median values in Table 3.2. In addition, the parameter set for 
Figure 3.2 is obtained from the median regression in Table 3.3. His consumption level is 
highest when he starts at age 79, and decreases until he reaches age 85.His wealth 
decreases and reaches zero at age 85. Above age 85, the person’s wealth keeps reaches 
zero and his consumption equals to his annuity income at $12,000. If the person dies 
before age 85, he leaves some bequest. However, such bequest is accidental since his 
bequest motive is essentially zero. In all these cases, since the person values future utility 
lower than current utility, his consumption level peaks at the first year and then decreases 
until it reaches his annuity income level.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This study investigates if and to what extent bequest motives exists for a sample 
of single elderly people. Our main goal in this study is to estimate a classical life-cycle 
model with bequests, as in Yaari (1965) and Hurd (1989) for elderly with individual-
specific subjective survival curves. In almost any life-cycle models, individual mortality 
risk is an important factor that affects people’s decisions. Previous literature assumes the 
individual mortality risk is the same as the life-table mortality risk, ignoring the apparent 
individual heterogeneity in their mortality risk. This assumption may cause biases in 
parameter estimates. This study applies the individual subjective survival probability 
model developed in an earlier study (GHM). Their subjective survival probabilities have 
significant variations across individuals, and can better predict actual survival experience 
than life tables. We find that the estimation results from mean regressions differ 
significantly from median regression results. Most importantly, mean regression yields 
very large desired bequests while the median regression implies almost zero bequest 
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motives. In addition, we find that life table mortality risk yields a little bit larger bequest 







Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Wealth 
(Being alive and single in the 2nd and 3rd waves; wealth is not negative; 
 not missing subjective survival question; in 1995 dollars) 
 
 wave 2 wave 3 wave 4 
 total non-housing Total non-housing total non-housing
 wealth wealth Wealth wealth wealth wealth 
Mean 221,728 173,042 211,760 168,634 174,428 118,112 
median 78,500 35,000 67,190 23,364 70,746 22,500 
std dev 1,416,500 1,446,572 1,299,766 1,253,508 404,712 317,598 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 -52,632 -157,895 
Maximum 43,325,000 43,225,000 36,794,393 31,186,916 8,368,421 5,679,825 








Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean std dev Median min max 
Age of respondents in 1995 79 5.21 78 63 92 
Income in wave 2      
    Sample of 1903 observations 17,764 22,146 12,000 468 466,000
    Sample of 1752 observations 18,107 22,873 12,000 468 466,000
Percentage who have children 80.2%     
Number of children  2.5514 2.3028 2 0 16 
Survival probabilities      
    optimism index (ψ) 0.6594 0.1176 0.6631 0.4385 1.0906
    subjective 3-year survival prob  0.8911 0.0509 0.9026 0.6225 0.9893
    life-table 3-year survival  prob 0.8347 0.0844 0.8592 0.4175 0.9790
    no. of observations in the sample 1752     
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results: 
(Marginal Utility of Bequest = 1child*( α0 + α1 * No. of kids), 














marginal utility  
of bequest  
(α0) 
marginal utility 
of bequest  
(α1) 
median  subjective 0.9855 0.9420 3.8067e-7 1.0431e-6 
  (0.0519) (0.0028) (8.957e-5) (4.6931e-5) 




      (0.1275) (0.0044) (8.601e-4) (1.7597e-4) 
Mean subjective 0.7870   1.0546 1.0008   1.0022 
  (1.544)  (0.8767) (0.1525) (0.925) 












Table 3.4: Robust Test with Median Regression Results 




















of bequest  
(α1) 
0.02 0.8933 1.0151 1.7789e-5 1.8797e-6 
 (0.1960) (0.0061) (3.3e-3) (7.9283e-4) 
0.03 0.8053 1.0049 7.2723e-6 3.57e-6 
 (0.1797) (0.0050) (2.8102e-3) (8.4822e-4) 
0.04 0.9855 0.9420 3.8067e-7 1.0431e-6 
 (0.0519) (0.0028) (8.957e-5) (4.6931e-5) 
0.05 0.9783 0.94 9.7635e-46 1.3841e-50 
 (0.2420) (0.0163) (2.6350e-020) (4.8609e-020) 
0.06 0.9007 0.9293 9.1176e-48 1.468e-44 








Table 3.5: Economic Significance of Marginal Utility of Bequest 
(For a hypothetical person: male, age 79, 2 kids, optimist index = 0.6594, 
























0.9855 0.942 2.4669e-6 $0.05 $1.17 
0.9855 0.942 .001 $21.12 $477.22 




R4 0.9855 0.942 1 $125,278 $1,082,618 
0.9855 0.70 .001 $2.59 $57.26 
0.9855 1.00 .001 $80.48 $1,434 
R5 
R6 
R7 0.9855 1.20 .001 $1,408 $18,238 
0. 0.9420 .001 $5.80 $116.7 
1.5 0.9420 .001 $129.5 $2,413 
R8 
R9 























Figure 3.1 Illustration of the Positive Bequest Case 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Illustration of the Zero Bequest Case 





Figure 3.3: Consumption and Wealth Trajectories at Median Wealth Level a 
 a  a hypothetical person: male, age 79, 2 kids, optimistic index  .6594, initial wealth $35,000, income  
$12,000; 
risk averse γ = 0.9855,  time discount β = 0.9420, bequest motive: α0 =3.8067e-7, α1 =1.0431e-6; 




APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION METHOD FOR CHAPTER 2 
A.1. Forms of Descriptive Statistical Models  
The criteria for choosing an appropriate descriptive statistical model are 
computational tractability and statistical efficiency in which it can provide a good 
description of the data. The linear probability models, as suggested by Keane and Smith 
(2003), fit the criteria precisely.  
In the present context, the linear probability models are constructed according to 
the observed data. Thus, the structures of the models differ because of the differences in 
the missing and unobserved data across the time periods. The descriptive statistical model 
at time t is given as  
ttitit xy υη += ,  ( )tt iidN ∑,0~υ      (A.1) 
where  is a vector of independent variables,  is the vector of regressors, ty tx
( ttt ∑= , )ηθ  is the set of parameters to be estimated. 
The construction of the descriptive models is described by time periods as 
follows. For convenience, I use the notations for the observed data to describe the model. 
(1) t = 1, i.e., age 16   
The regressors include a constant term, schooling years, indicator of sickness, and 
duration of sickness:   
( 1111 ,,,1 slDschx = ).        (A.2) 
Note that because of the data limitation in calculating the effective schooling 
years edu, I use the observed schooling years sch. The indicator for the success in the 
school is chosen as an independent variable.  
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The set of dependent variables consists of the choice of working, wage, choice of 
schooling, indicators of passing the grade, and indictors of sickness at period two. The 
dependent variables are allowed to differ in their sizes. If for some individuals, one or 
more dependent variables were missing or unobserved, then the corresponding dependent 
variables are accordingly missing from these samples. For example, the transcript data 
were missing or unobserved for individual i (unobserved transcript may occur because he 
was in middle school or college during the time of survey), then the dependent variable of 
the indicator of the passing of a grade will not be included for this individual. The set of 
the dependent variables for the observed data is  
( )( )21 1,2111,11 ,,,, Dschoolhighpassdwdy = .                    (A.3) 
The simulated data consists of the same individuals as in observed data, except 
that the simulated discrete variables are replaced by the smooth functions discussed in the 
Section 2. That is to say that the number of linear regression equations for simulated data 
and observed data is equal.  
 
(2) 1< t < 6, i.e. from age 17 to 20 
For t = 3, 4 or 5, the regressors include a constant term, schooling years, working 
experiences, choice of job participation, choice of school attendance, indicator of 
sickness, and duration of sickness:   
( )ttttttt slDddepschx ,,,,,,1 1,21,1= ,                (A.4.1) 
The independent variables for t = 2 are different from those for t = 3, 4 or 5, in 
which working experience was not included because at this period  is equal to  




( )221 1,211,122 ,,,,,1 slDddschx = ,                 (A.4.2) 





)(( )ttttt Dschoolhighpassdwdy ,,,, 1,21,1= .                (A.5) 
Similar to the case of t = 1, if some observed variables were missing or 
unobserved, the corresponding dependents were also missing.   
 
(3) t = 6, i.e., age 21. At this age, some agents start to have asset data and some 
do not. The set of the independent variables are the same as in (A.4.1). The set of 
dependent variables are  
( )( )671 6,2616,16 ,,,,, ADschoolhighpassdwdy = ,                    (A.6)   
 
(4) 6 < t < 16, i.e., from age 22 to 30 
Two descriptive statistical models are set apart by the asset data. Both of the 
models have the same set of dependent variables: 
( )tttttt ADdwdy ,,,, 11,21,1 += .       (A.7) 
Note that the indicator for passing the grade is not included in (A.7) because of 
the convenient assumption that individuals should have finished their high school by age 
22. Actually, in my data only 5 samples were in high school over 21 years old. 
The first model includes all the individuals whose assets at 1−t  were missing or 
unobserved. In contrast, the second model includes all the individuals whose asset at 
 were observed. The set of the independent variables for the first model is the same 
as in (A.4.1), while for the second one it is  
1−t
( )11 1,21 1,1 ,,,,,,,1 −−−= tttttttt AslDddepschx      (A.8) 
 
(5) t = 16, i.e. age 32 
The descriptive statistical models are similar to the case of 6 < t < 16, in which the 
models are distinguished by whether the assets at period 15 were observed. The set of 
independent variables for the first model is     
( )16161 15,2115,1161616 ,,,,,,1 slDddepschx =      (A.9.1) 
and for the second model is  
( )1516161 15,2115,1161616 ,,,,,,,1 AslDddepschx =                 (A.9.2) 
Because the sample does not contain the information for health at t = 17, the set of 
dependent variables is 
( )161 16,216116,116 ,,, Adwdy =        (A.10) 
  
A.2. Two-Step Approach 
For the sake of computational tractability, I use the two-step approach as proposed 
by Keane and Smith (2003) to estimate the parameters of the structural model. The idea 
of the first step is to obtain a consistent estimate 1ψ̂  of the structural parameters by 
solving the optimization problem (2.21) in Section 2. In the first step, the number of 
simulated data sets F is set to 1, which substantially reduce the computation time. In 
addition, a relatively large value for the smoothing parameter λ is chosen (λ = 0.05) to 
ensure the objective function is smooth.   
In the second step, to reduce bias I choose λ equal to 0.003 and F equal to 100. 
According to Proposition 2 in Keane and Smith (2003),  


















~~,;ˆˆˆ ψψψψ zyLJJzyLJ  
is a consistent and asymptotically normal estimate of 0ψ , where  is the Hessian of 
the likelihood function associated with the descriptive model and  is an estimate of the 
Jacobian of the binding function 
ΘΘL
Ĵ
( )1ψ̂Η . 
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APPENDIX B: ALGORITHM TO FIND THE OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION AND WEALTH 
PATH IN CHAPTER 3 
Step 1:  Check the high wealth case, in which a strictly positive bequest is left at 
the maximum age of life, i.e., wN+1 > 0.   
(1) From equation (3.3a), we calculate the consumption trajectory . },0,{ Ntcbt L=
(2) Substitute the trajectory of consumption into Equation (3.3b) 
to get the wealth trajectory .  
},0,{ Ntcbt L=
}1,,1,{ += Ntwbt L
(3) If for all ,  and , then report  and go to 
next observation; else go to Step 2. 
{ }Nt ,,2,1 K∈ 0≥btw 01>+bNw bw3
Step 2: Check the medium wealth case, in which the wealth at the end of 
maximum age of life is zero, i.e., wN+1 = 0, and at all other time periods t < N, wt > 0. We 
use backward induction to get the consumption and wealth trajectories.   
(1) From (3.4a), ct (t = 0, …, N -1) is a function of  cN  by recursive iteration: ct 
= ct(cN). Substitute the trajectory of consumption {ct(cN), t = 0, …, N -1} into Equation 
(3.4b) such that wealth level in (3.4b) now is only a function of cN . In particular, we 
have: 
( ) 0, 01 =+ wcw NN         (B1) 
Given observed w0, we can solve (B1) to get cN, denoted as . Given , we can 





{ }1,,0, −= Ntcbt L . However, if we do not know w0, 
we will have many values of cN and w0 such that (B1) are satisfied. Among them, the 
higher bound  is the maximum of w0 such that (B1) is satisfied and ct > 0 for all t < 





(2) If for all , , then calculate the wealth trajectory 
from Equation (3.2); else go to Step 3. 




(3) If for all , , then report  and go to next 
observation; else go to Step 3. 
{ }Nt ,,2,1 K∈ 0>btw bw3
Step 3: Check the low wealth case, in which the wealth reaches zero at a time 
period T < N. We search all over the possible T from the backward. The method is similar 
to Step 2.   
(1) Let T = N.  From (3.5b), ct (t = 0, …, T -2) is a function of  cT-1  by 
recursive iteration: ct = ct(cT-1). Substitute the trajectory of consumption {ct(cT-1), t = 
0, …, T -2} into Equation (3.5c) such that (3.5c) now is only a function of cT-1 . Solve the 
equation: wT= 0 to get cT-1, denoted as . We can get the consumption trajectory bTc 1−
{ }Ntcbt ,,0, L=  by applying (3.5b) with given .  bTc 1−
(2) If for all { }1,,1,0 −∈ TK 0>btc
1,,2,1
t , , then calculate the wealth trajectory 
 from Equation (3.2); else let T =  T-1,  and repeat (1) - (2). }1,,1,{ −= Ttwbt L
(3) If for all { }−∈ Tt K 0>btw, , then break from the cycle, report  
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